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I.

ABSTRACT

This Article presents steps that governments can take now to encourage the
development, deployment, and use of automated road vehicles. After providing
technical and legal context, it describes key administrative, legal, and community
strategies to promote automated driving. It concludes by urging policymakers to
facilitate automated driving in part by expecting more from today’s drivers and
vehicles.
II.

INTRODUCTION

This Article responds to a frequent question from public officials at all
levels of government in the United States and abroad: “What can we do to get selfdriving cars here now?” This question reflects a generalized desire to encourage a
set of technologies that could fundamentally redefine society’s relationship with
mobility. It also reflects a more specific desire that the research, development,
demonstration, and deployment of these automated driving technologies happen
“here” rather than elsewhere.
The strategies presented in this Article address both desires. These
strategies are directed primarily at state and local governments in the United States,
but many are also relevant to the federal government and to governments in other
countries. The focus is not on regulating automated driving, which is a topic
considered elsewhere,1 but rather on encouraging it. Positively affecting automated
driving is also distinct from actually effecting it: Outstanding technical and quasitechnical challenges mean that a government could not will full driving automation
into existence even by mandating it.
Overcoming these challenges will require tremendous technological
advances in design as well as in assurance. No serious developers claim that their
automated driving systems are “ready” for unsupervised operation across a wide

1. See, e.g., JAMES M. ANDERSON ET AL., RAND CORP., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGY: A
GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2016), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR443-2.html; INT’L
TRANSP. FORUM, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), AUTOMATED AND AUTONOMOUS
DRIVING: REGULATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 593 (May 2015) [hereinafter OECD, REGULATION UNDER
UNCERTAINTY], http://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/files/docs/15cpb_autonomousdriving.pdf (Bryant
Walker Smith & Joakim Svensson, principal contributing authors); Bryant Walker Smith, Regulation and
the Risk of Inaction, in AUTONOMES FAHREN: TECHNISCHE, RECHTLICHE UND GESELLSCHAFTLICHE
ASPEKTE (Markus Maurer et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter Smith, Risk of Inaction]; Bryant Walker Smith,
Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411 (2014)
[hereinafter Smith, Automated Vehicles are Probably Legal].
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range of complex driving environments.2 Indeed, no such developer has even
publicly clarified what readiness actually entails. Eventually, however, a company
will candidly explain how it “(a) defines reasonable safety, (b) will satisfy itself that
its system is reasonably safe, and (c) will continue to do so over the lifetime of the
system.”3 At that point, automated driving will be imminent.
Governments can anticipate—and possibly even accelerate—this watershed
by taking some or all of the actions described in this Article. These strategies, which
were identified through extensive discussions with developers and regulators of
automated driving systems as well as other emerging technologies, are roughly
organized into three overlapping categories:


Administrative strategies include preparing government agencies,
preparing public infrastructure, leveraging procurement, and advocating
for safety mandates.



Legal strategies entail carefully analyzing and, as necessary, clarifying
existing law as it applies to automated driving; many of these strategies
would also internalize more of the costs of conventional driving in a way
that could properly incentivize automated driving.



Community strategies involve identifying specific local needs,
opportunities, and resources that may be relevant to automated driving—
and that could inform applications for public and private grants that may
soon be announced.

Critically, these strategies do not include passing the kind of superficial
“autonomous driving law” that has been popular in statehouses. By increasing the
inconsistency and incoherence of state vehicle codes, such laws can actually stymie
rather than encourage automated driving.
In contrast, more useful actions start with a nuanced understanding of the
relevant technologies, their applications, and the existing laws that they implicate.
Accordingly, this Article begins with social, legal, and technical overviews. It also
relies on the levels of driving automation developed by SAE International, which
provide a common vocabulary for developers, regulators, and policymakers.4
Although different forms of automated driving merit different policy
responses, an overarching theme of this Article is that policymakers can encourage
automated driving by expecting more from today’s drivers and vehicles. This is a
crucial message with implications for other emerging technologies: New

2. See Bryant Walker Smith, A Legal Perspective on Three Misconceptions in Vehicle Automation,
in LECTURE NOTES IN MOBILITY: ROAD VEHICLE AUTOMATION 85, 85 (2014) [hereinafter Smith, Three
Misconceptions].
3. Bryant Walker Smith, New Years Resolutions for Developers of Automated Vehicles, CTR. FOR
INTERNET & SOC’Y (Jan. 10, 2016, 9:03 AM) [hereinafter Smith, New Years Resolutions],
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/01/new-years-resolutions-developers-automated-vehicles; see
also Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1.
4. See SAE INT’L, J3016: TAXONOMY AND DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS RELATED TO ON-ROAD
MOTOR VEHICLE AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS (Jan. 16, 2014) [hereinafter SAE J3016]. I was one of
the primary authors of this document as well as of the forthcoming revision.
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technologies are still part of this world, and governments seeking to promote or
regulate them should do so with a clearer and more critical understanding of today’s
legal and policy structures.
III.
A.

IN CONTEXT

A Future Different from the Present

The Jetsons fallacy5 describes predictions made by extrapolating individual
items of interest into the future while holding everything else in the world—other
technologies, laws, norms, values, and markets—constant. In this way, although The
Jetsons (a 1960s television show set a century in the future)6 features flying cars,
these cars are manually driven by men, and an entire episode revels in the sexist trope
that women are bad drivers.7 The writers essentially launched the 1960s into space.
Policymakers should strive to avoid the Jetsons fallacy by checking and
noting their assumptions about the present as well as the future. In the context of
automated driving, this means liberating visions of automated systems from
conventional notions about the design, operation, and ownership of cars.
Consider, for example, potential transportation options for someone who,
years from now, needs to buy a set of contact lenses. They may walk or bike to a
convenience store—a trip that might be safer and more enjoyable if automated
vehicles properly yield the right of way to them. They might manually drive their
personal car, direct that car to drive them, or get picked up by a robotaxi that they
share simultaneously or sequentially with others. Alternately, they might have the
lenses delivered by sidewalk robot, take delivery by aerial drone, or simply print the
lenses on their 3D printer. A vision of the future in which vehicles are simply robotic
versions of “your father’s Oldsmobile”8 fails to capture this potential diversity.
A broader vision can also challenge economic assumptions about
automated driving. On one hand, wealthy car owners may be the first to use advanced
driver assistance systems. As these systems become more advanced, they may
compete with airlines (and trains and even hotels) for long-distance travel. On the
other hand, a wider range of people living in dense urban areas, bus-dependent
suburbs, retirement communities, and military bases could conceivably be some of
the first to routinely use driverless shuttles that are initially restricted to particular
geographic areas.
This broader vision also suggests that the rash of recent studies purporting
to measure consumer demand for automated driving provides little insight into the

5. See, e.g., Lisa Mundy, The Jetson Fallacy: Much Longer Lifespan Could Explode the Nuclear
Family,
SLATE
(Oct.
21,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/
2013/10/jetson_fallacy_if_we_live_to_150_the_nuclear_family_will_explode.html.
6. The Jetsons, HANNA-BARBERA WIKI, http://hanna-barbera.wikia.com/wiki/The_Jetsons (last
visited Mar. 11, 2016).
7. Matt Novak, Jane Jetson and the Origins of the “Women are Bad Drivers” Joke, SMITHSONIAN
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/jane-jetson-and-the-origins-of-the-women-arebad-drivers-joke-17672597/.
8. Edward McClelland, It Really Was My Father’s Oldsmobile, SALON (Apr. 2, 2009, 6:30 AM),
https://www.salon.com/2009/04/02/oldsmobile/.
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actual appeal of automated systems.9 These systems could eventually serve a broad
range of consumers, including those who cannot, cannot yet, or can no longer drive;
those who cannot afford to drive as well as those who can earn more by not driving;
and those who discover that relaxing in a car or even at home is preferable to driving.
Businesses may also turn to automated systems to perform delivery and other
logistics functions that may depend less on individual consumer beliefs about
automated driving. In short, governments should plan on the basis of tomorrow’s
potential utility, not today’s purported perception.
Internet access illustrates how state and local governments might approach
policy choices regarding automated driving. Imagine a municipality in the 1990s
deciding whether and how to aggressively pursue Internet access for its residents.
Many of these residents, if surveyed, might report little interest in such access
because they had yet to realize its broad utility and eventual appeal.10
The local government might accordingly decline to make any infrastructure
investments and defer to private infrastructure operators. The result would be, much
as it is today, higher speeds in areas that are wealthier, denser, and otherwise more
economically attractive with lower speeds—even dial-up—to others.11
That government might instead decide to deploy a citywide broadband
network. The result could be a smattering of communities with Gigabit speeds and
the unique opportunities that such speeds create. These communities can be found
all across the United States today.12
Alternatively, that government might recognize the potential of broadband
but, rather than developing a municipal network, hope to become a flagship center
for a private company’s efforts. Many communities have actually made this gamble,
and some of them have been rewarded by projects such as Google Fiber.13
Finally, at the same time that communities are considering, developing, or
competing for these networks, another technology—like high-speed cellular—may
emerge as an unexpected alternative. This, in many areas, has also happened.14
9. E.g., BRANDON SCHOETTLE & MICHAEL SIVAK, UNIV. OF MICH. TRANSP. RESEARCH INST., A
SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT AUTONOMOUS AND SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES IN THE U.S., THE U.K.,
AUSTRALIA
(July
2014),
https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/
AND
108384/103024.pdf; Press Release, Inst. of Elec. & Elecs. Eng’rs (IEEE), IEEE Survey Indicates When it
Comes to Driverless Cars—You can Take Me, but not My Kids (Oct. 15, 2015),
https://www.ieee.org/about/news/2015/15october_2015.html; Press Release, World Econ. Forum, SelfDriving
Vehicles
in
an
Urban
Context
3
(Nov.
24,
2015),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Press%20release.pdf.
10. See SUSANNAH FOX & LEE RAINIE, PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE WEB AT 25 IN THE U.S., at 9–10
(Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/part-1-how-the-internet-has-woven-itself-intoamerican-life/.
11. See 2016 Broadband Progress Report: Residential Fixed 25 Mbps/3 Mbps Broadband
Deployment,
FCC,
https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/maps/bpr-2016-fixed-25mbps-3mbpsdeployment/ (last updated Jan. 29, 2016).
12. Broadband USA: Connecting America’s Communities, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.
(NTIA), U.S. DEP’T OF COM., http://www2.ntia.doc.gov/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2016); Community Network
Map,
INST.
FOR
LOC.
SELF-RELIANCE,
http://www.muninet
works.org/communitymap
(last
updated
Oct.
2015);
NAT’L
BROADBAND
MAP,
https://www.broadbandmap.gov/technology (last updated June 30, 2014).
13. Expansion Plans, GOOGLE FIBER, https://fiber.google.com/newcities/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2016).
14. NAT’L BROADBAND MAP, supra note 12.
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These scenarios foreshadow the public opportunities and challenges in
encouraging vehicle automation. Some state and local governments will do nothing,
while others will move aggressively. All will encounter surprises.
The result will likely be a mixture of optional luxury features as well as
standard safety devices, publicly supported transit systems as well as privately
managed mobility services, and localized deployments as well as (nominally)
nationwide networks.
Because the opportunities available to a particular community may depend
in part—though by no means exclusively—on policies that find their expression in
law, the next part considers this legal context.
B.

The Legal Context

Automated vehicles15 will confront a complex web of existing law about
their design, marketing, and operation. Some of this law may hinder deployment of
these vehicles, some may help deployment, some may have an uncertain effect, and
some will have no effect at all. Two related points are critical to understanding the
role of this existing law.
First, details matter. A 2012 review of relevant law found a variety of rules
that could conceivably complicate the legal operation of automated vehicles.16 New
York, for example, requires a driver to keep at least one hand on the steering wheel
while her vehicle is in motion.17 Other states specify minimum following distances
that would be incompatible with automated vehicle platoons.18 California requires
insurers to base their rates on factors that may make little sense in a world of
automated vehicles.19 And the Federal Transit Act could complicate federally funded
projects that eliminate existing transit jobs.20
Second, the broader social context will shape many of these details. Laws
can change even though their text remains the same.21 Whether automated driving is
consistent with state provisions requiring vehicles to be safe and drivers to act
prudently, for example, could depend on whether society embraces or rejects
automation. Societal views, for their part, will depend at least as much on compelling
stories, pictures, and numbers as they will upon the realities of the technologies.
New laws could likewise help or hinder automated driving. A key corollary
is that passage of an automated driving bill actually says very little about a state’s

15. An automated vehicle is one for which the real-time driving task is automated. Although this term
has been criticized, see, e.g., SAE J3016, supra note 4, once defined it is useful shorthand for this broad
category of vehicles.
16. Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 11, at 413.
17. Id. at 485 (citing N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1226 (McKinney 2013)).
18. Id. at 519–21.
19. Robert W. Peterson, New Technology—Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and California’s
Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341, 1345–46 (2012).
20. See Federal Transit Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b) (2012) (also known as Section 13(c)); see also
Daniel Duff et al., Transit Coop. Research Program (TCRP), Legal Aspects Relevant to Outsourcing
Transit Functions Not Traditionally Outsourced, in 38 LEGAL RESEARCH DIGEST 3–4 (July 2011),
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/tcrp/tcrp_lrd_38.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353,
357 (1989).
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preparation for or promotion of automated driving. Michigan, for example, enacted
a statute that expressly prohibits any automated driving other than for research and
development.22 California required its Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) to
develop regulations for general consumer operation that are now over a year overdue
and have only increased uncertainty about the legal status of automated driving in
that state.23
Key developers of automated systems have either opposed or declined to
support many state bills on automated driving.24 These developers are generally wary
of both process (legislative and potentially administrative efforts in multiple states)
and product (disparate legal regimes that create confusion, inconsistency, and
unintended impediments to innovation). A legislator who introduces a bill without
consulting these developers may get their attention—but probably not their affection.
In contrast, useful legislation will come from “legal research and
development.”25 Established developers of automated systems should be conducting
legal research commensurate with their technical research. When they are ready to
publicly test or deploy a system, they should understand what specific legal changes
(if any) are necessary or helpful. Google requested and closely shaped bills in
Nevada and, to a lesser extent, California.26 A truck platooning developer, Peloton,
requested a specific bill in Utah.27 Years earlier, Segway took a similar approach
nationwide.28 Uber has largely succeeded (at least in the United States) in codifying
its argument that it is materially different from a traditional taxi dispatch company.29
This pattern will happen again: A prominent company will announce an automated
driving product or service and will then describe any specific legal changes necessary
for its deployment. If the message (or messenger) is powerful, many states will likely
accede.

22. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.244 (West 2014).
23. Compare
S.
Rules
Comm.,
S.B.
1298,
112th
Cong.
(Cal.
2012),
http://www.legislature.ca.gov/cgi-bin/port-postquery?bill_number=sb_1298&sess=
1112&house=B&author=padilla (specifying a January 2015 deadline for a final rule), with Deployment
of Autonomous Vehicles for Public Operation, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/
vr/autonomous/auto (last visited Nov. 2, 2016) (releasing an early draft of that rule in December 2015).
24. E.g., Aman Batheja, Self-Driving Car Bill Stalled by Google, Carmakers, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 22,
2015), https://www.texastribune.org/2015/04/22/self-driving-car-bill-stalled-google-carmakers/.
25. See, e.g., Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1.
26. Justin Pritchard, How Google Got States to Legalize Driverless Cars, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May
30, 2014, 8:15 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/how-google-got-states-legalize-driverless-cars.
27. See
H.B.
373,
2015
Gen.
Sess.,
114th
Cong.
(Utah
2015),
http://le.utah.gov/~2015/bills/static/HB0373.html.
28. See
Become
Familiar
with
the
Regulations
in
Your
State,
SEGWAY,
http://www.segway.com/support/regulatory-information (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (providing the
regulatory information regarding Segways for various states).
29. See, e.g., Alison Griswold, Uber Pulled Off a Spectacular Political Coup and Hardly Anyone
Noticed, QUARTZ (Jan. 21, 2016), http://qz.com/589041/uber-pulled-off-a-spectacular-political-coupand-hardly-anyone-noticed/; Heather Somerville & Dan Levine, Uber Winning Make or Break Legal
Battles Across America, REUTERS (Dec. 11, 2015, 8:55 am), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uberstatelaws-idUSKBN0TT2MZ20151211. But see David Hellier, From Rio to Paris—Uber is Fighting
Battles
Across
the
Globe,
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
2,
2015,
12:27
PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/02/uber-global-battles-from-rio-paris-amsterdam.
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Public actors can also undertake legal research and development.30 Some
developers may be too small to obtain sufficient legal advice or too politically
powerless to obtain legal change. California’s process, for example, disadvantaged
particular systems—like automated trucks31 and delivery robots32—that Google was
not publicly pursuing. In these cases, legal R&D may identify useful legal changes
that more established developers may not need or even want.
This kind of policy work may also identify public interests that are
challenged either by specific technologies or by bills that would ostensibly advance
those technologies. The first generation of automated driving bills saw
disagreements about certifying safety, reporting incidents, collecting data, and
limiting liability that involved conflicts in values and interests.33 Legal R&D
undertaken by or for government can inspire and inform these policy discussions.
Legal R&D can also help to match legal tools to policy goals. Legislation
is only one of these tools: Law can also be made or shaped through agency rules,
executive orders, legal opinions, and policy guidance. Moreover, as the strategies in
this Article demonstrate, policymaking is much broader than classic lawmaking.
As noted at the outset, this Article does not recommend a comprehensive
policy toward automated driving. Instead, it identifies strategies for state and local
governments that want to encourage this set of technologies and applications. The
next part explains these technologies and applications by reference to three pathways
to fully automated driving.
C.

Three Pathways to Fully Automated Driving

Full automation entails the complete replacement of the human driver under
all roadway and environmental conditions.34 Although a fully automated vehicle
does not yet exist,35 there are at least three development pathways that could
eventually lead to such a vehicle: advanced driver assistance systems, automated
emergency intervention systems, and driverless systems.
An advanced driver assistance system (ADAS) supports a human driver
by performing some combination of steering, braking, and accelerating over a
sustained period. Many such systems are already available in production vehicles:

30. See infra text accompanying note 31.
CODE
REGS.,
tit.
13,
§ 227.52
(2014),
31. See
CAL.
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/d48f347b-8815-458e-9df25ded9f208e9e/adopted_txt.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&amp;CONVERT_TO=url&amp;CACHEID=d48f347
b-8815-458e-9df2-5ded9f208e9e (excluding any “vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of 10,001 or more
pounds” from the state’s automated driving testing regime).
32. See id. § 227.34 (requiring the operator of an automated test vehicle to be “seated in the vehicle’s
driver seat”).
33. See generally Gabriel Weiner & Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving, Legislative and
Regulatory Action, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Oct. 2, 2016 5:06 PM),
https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:_Legislative_and_
Regulatory_Action.
34. SAE J3016, supra note 4. SAE’s levels of driving automation describe driving automation
systems rather than vehicles, but for simplicity this paper refers directly to vehicles equipped with such
systems.
35. Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2.
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Under optimal conditions, some luxury vehicles from Daimler,36 Nissan,37 Volvo,38
and Tesla,39 among others,40 can adjust their speed based on traffic conditions,
maintain lane position even through gradual curves, and come to a complete stop to
avoid or mitigate a crash. Many automakers are likely to introduce similar features
on more models in the next few years.
Moreover, the capabilities of these systems are likely to improve in the
future. SAE International’s levels of driving automation describe the respective roles
of the driving automation system and the human driver for present as well as
potential driving automation systems.41
The production systems described above currently achieve no more than
level two automation; at any moment the human driver may need to resume actively
steering, accelerating, or decelerating.
A particularly significant jump will occur at level three when, as a technical
matter, the human driver need not monitor the driving environment while the
automated driving system is engaged.42 This is also the point at which state
automated-driving laws probably apply.43 Even at this point, however, the human
driver may still play an important role by actively driving in situations outside of the
particular system’s design parameters. In this way, the human driver acts as a backup
to the automated driving system.

36. S-Class Sedan, MERCEDES-BENZ, https://www.mbusa.com/mercedes/vehicles/class/class-S (last
visited Nov. 15, 2016).
37. 2017 Q50 Sedan, INFINITI, http://www.infinitiusa.com/sedan/q50/highlights/technology.html
(last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
38. 2017 XC 90, VOLVO, http://www.volvocars.com/us/cars/new-models/all-new-xc90 (last visited
Nov. 15, 2016).
39. Your Autopilot Has Arrived, TESLA MOTORS (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www.teslamotors.com/
blog/your-autopilot-has-arrived.
40. See generally MYCARDOESWHAT.ORG, https://mycardoeswhat.org (last visited Nov. 15, 2016)
41. See SAE J3016, supra note 4; Bryant Walker Smith, SAE Levels of Driving Automation, CTR.
FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Dec. 18, 2013, 10:33 am), cyberlaw.stanford.edu/loda.
42. Because of the difficult human factors issues discussed below, however, SAE level 3 automated
driving systems will likely be deployed in only a limited set of lower-risk scenarios, if at all.
43. SAE J3016, supra note 4, at 2 (“[SAE Level 3 is defined as] the driving mode-specific
performance by an automated driving system of all aspects of the dynamic driving task with the
expectation that the human driver will respond appropriately to a request to intervene.”). State laws on the
research-and-development testing of automated vehicles generally define an automated vehicle as one that
is capable of operating without the active monitoring of a human driver – and yet many of the research
vehicles that have been tested on public roads still do need active monitoring precisely because they are
only research vehicles.

108

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47; No. 1

SAE Levels of Driving Automation (J3016)
SAE International’s levels of driving automation are descriptive rather than normative and
technical rather than legal. Elements indicate minimum rather than maximum capabilities for
each level. In this table, “system” refers to the driving automation system or automated
driving system (ADS), as appropriate. Information Report J3016 fully describes each level and
defines each of the Italicized terms.

Level and name

Definition

Dynamic Driving Task
(DDT)
Sustained Object and
lateral and
Event
longitudinal Detection
vehicle
and
motion
Response
control
(OEDR)

DDT
fallback

Operational
Design
Domain
(ODD)

Driver performs part or all of the DDT

0

1

2

No
Automation

The performance by the driver of the
entire DDT, even when enhanced by
active safety systems.

Driver

Driver

Driver

n/a

Driving
Assistance

The sustained and ODD-specific
execution by a driving automation
system of either the lateral or the
longitudinal vehicle motion control
subtask of the DDT (but not both
simultaneously) with the expectation
that the driver performs the remainder
of the DDT.

Driver
and
System

Driver

Driver

Limited

Partial
Automation

The sustained and ODD-specific
execution by a driving automation
system of both the lateral and
longitudinal vehicle motion control
subtasks of the DDT with the
expectation that the driver supervises
the driving automation system.

System

Driver

Driver

Limited

System

System

Fallbackready user

Limited

ADS (“System”) performs the entire DDT (while engaged)

3

Conditional
Automation

The sustained and ODD-specific
performance by an ADS of the entire
DDT with the expectation that the DDT
fallback-ready user is receptive to ADSissued requests to intervene, as well as
to malfunctions in other vehicle
systems, and will respond appropriately.

4

High
Automation

The sustained and ODD-specific
performance by an ADS of the entire
DDT and DDT fallback, without any
expectation that a user will respond to a
request to intervene.

System

System

System

Limited

Full
Automation

The sustained and unconditional (i.e.,
not ODD-specific) performance by an
ADS of the entire DDT and DDT
fallback without any expectation that a
user will response to a request to
intervene.

System

System

System

Unlimited

5
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In contrast, an automated emergency intervention system (AEIS)44 acts
as a backup to a human driver by intervening to warn of, mitigate, or even prevent a
crash or other potentially dangerous situation.45 The most common of these systems
is electronic stability control, which has been required on all new passenger vehicles
in the United States since 201246 and will eventually be required on all new large
trucks and buses.47 Although other advanced systems have also entered the market,
currently they are standard on only a tiny fraction of new vehicles and wholly
unavailable on most.48 However, the U.S. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) has announced that its New Car Assessment Program
(NCAP) will endorse crash-imminent braking49 and that some automakers will
voluntarily equip their vehicles with this feature.50 The U.S. National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB), for its part, has called for more aggressive action to promote
collision avoidance technologies for years.51
As with advanced driver assistance systems, automated emergency
intervention systems are likely to improve significantly.52 At this point, they cannot
substitute for a vigilant and capable human driver. However, an eventual result of
these improvements may be vehicles that are nominally driven by a human but are

44. Automated emergency intervention systems are part of a larger set of technologies generally
called active safety.
45. Including, for example, skidding (antilock braking system) or inadvertently leaving a lane (lane
departure warning). SAE’s levels of driving automation exclude automated emergency intervention
systems. See generally SAE J3016, supra note 4; Bryant Walker Smith, Lawyers and Engineers Should
Speak the Same Robot Language, in ROBOT LAW 78, 96–97 (Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin, & Ian
Kerr eds., 2016) [hereinafter Smith, Lawyers and Engineers] (discussing the relationships between the
two kinds of systems).
46. Electronic Stability Control Systems for Light Vehicles, 49 C.F.R. § 571.126 (2015); Electronic
Stability Control System Phase-In Reporting Requirements 49 C.F.R. § 585.85 (2014).
47. Electronic Stability Control Systems for Heavy Vehicles, 49 C.F.R. § 571.136 (2015).
48. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REP.: THE USE OF FORWARD
COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE REAR-END CRASHES 37-38 (May 19,
2015), http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR1501.pdf; see also Safety Feature
Links: By Car Manufacturer, MYCARDOESWHAT.ORG, https://mycardoeswhat.org/manufacturers/ (last
visited Feb. 1, 2017).
49. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Transportation Secretary Foxx Announces
Plan to Add Two Automatic Emergency Braking Systems to Recommended Vehicle Advanced
Technology
Features
(Jan.
22,
2015),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About-NHTSA/PressReleases/NHTSA-sets-AEB-plans,-highlights-lives-saved-report.
50. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., DOT and IIHS Announce Historic
Commitment from 10 Automakers to Include Automatic Emergency Braking on All New Vehicles (Sept.
11,
2015),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About-NHTSA/PressReleases/nhtsa_iihs_commitment_on_aeb_09112015.
51. See, e.g., NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., NTSB/SIR-15/01, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REPORT: THE
USE OF FORWARD COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE REAR-END CRASHES
37–38 (May 19, 2015), http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR1501.pdf; Press
Release, Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., NTSB Calls for Immediate Action on Collision Avoidance Systems
for Vehicles; Cites Slow Progress as Major Safety Issue (June 8, 2015), http://www.ntsb.gov/news/pressreleases/Pages/PR20150608b.aspx.
52. The SAE taxonomy introduced above applies only to automated driving systems and expressly
excludes automated emergency intervention systems. See SAE J3016, supra note 4. However, a similar
taxonomy could apply. Smith, Lawyers and Engineers, supra note 45, at 17 n.87.
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subject to routine automatic interventions to avoid dangerous behaviors and
situations.
Both advanced driver assistance systems and automated emergency
intervention systems present difficult questions of human-machine interaction.53 The
transition between the automated driving system and the human driver is
challenging: A human driver needs time and context to regain the situational
awareness necessary to actively drive. In addition, some of these systems could
encourage overreliance by the human driver or lead to the degradation of manual
driving skills. Commercial aviation is already struggling with each of these
challenges.54
One response to this “‘mushy middle’ of automation”55 is a truly driverless
system. Such a system avoids these human factors issues by performing all of the
driving; the human occupants, if any, are merely passengers for the entirety of the
trip. Driverless vehicles that are currently being tested or demonstrated include the
latest iteration of Google’s cars,56 Induct’s Navia,57 and the showcase projects of the
European Union’s CityMobil initiatives.
As with testing and demonstration, initial deployments of SAE level four
systems will likely be characterized by some combination of slow speeds, simple
environments, and supervised operations. Slow speeds can reduce the likelihood and
magnitude of harm, simple environments can reduce the complexity of the design
challenge, and some kind of supervised operations can help to identify and address
problems. Evolution of these driverless systems will bring higher speeds, more
complex environments, and less real-time oversight.

53. See generally Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2.
54. Three incidents in particular each reflect a particular “human factors” concern: BUREAU
D’EQUETES ET D’ANALYSES POUR LA SECURITE DE L’AVIATION CIVILE, FINAL REPORT: ON THE
ACCIDENT ON 1ST JUNE 2009 TO THE AIRBUS A330-203 REGISTERED F-GZCP OPERATED BY AIR FRANCE
FLIGHT AF 447 RIO DE JANEIRO—PARIS, at 200–201 (July 2012), https://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/fcp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf (noting overstimulation may have contributed to the 2009 crash of
Air France Flight 447 over the Atlantic Ocean); NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., OPERATIONAL
FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE GROUP CHAIRMAN’S FACTUAL REPORT (Dec. 4, 2009),
http://dms.ntsb.gov/public/48000-48499/48456/431893.pdf (noting understimulation may have
contributed to a 2009 incident in which Northwest Flight 188 overflew the Minneapolis airport by 150
miles); NAT’L TRANSP. SECURITY BD., NTSB/AAR-14/01, ACCIDENT REPORT: DESCENT BELOW VISUAL
GLIDEPATH AND IMPACT WITH SEAWALL, ASIANA AIRLINES FLIGHT 214, BOEING 777-200ER, HL7742,
SAN
FRANCISCO,
CALIFORNIA,
at
74
(July
6,
2013),
http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/AAR1401.pdf
(noting
that
skills
degradation may have contributed to the 2013 crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 at the San Francisco
Airport).
55. Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2, at 86.
56. The speed of these cars is capped at 25 mph. FAQ: Google Self-Driving Car Project, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/faq/#q7 (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (“How do the vehicles behave
on the road?”)
57. Induct’s Navia is an automated shuttle that is designed to shuttle up to ten people and can
accommodate a user in a wheelchair. Andrew Del-Colle, CES 2014: The Navia Driverless Electric Shuttle
Could Be the First Autonomous Vehicle You Meet, POPULAR MECHANICS (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.popularmechanics.com/cars/hybrid-electric/a9912/ces-2014-the-navia-driverless-electricshuttle-could-be-the-first-autonomous-vehicle-you-meet-16367628/. The shuttle can travel up to 12.5
mph. Id.
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For example, a university campus, a central business district, or a military
base may host an early system of automated shuttles or robotic taxis that travel at
low speeds while being remotely monitored by a team of specialists. Later, this
system may be gradually deployed to other geographic areas, on more roadway
types, in more difficult traffic and weather conditions, at higher speeds, and without
nearby technical specialists. For a long time, however, location will matter.
Dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) may play a role in each
of these three pathways toward full driving automation.58 Platooning—in which
convoys of closely spaced and coordinated vehicles travel together on a highway—
typically relies on dedicated short-range communications and advanced driver
assistance systems. Dangers that are not in the line of sight may be mitigated by
automated emergency intervention systems that are DSRC-capable. And driverless
systems operating in central business districts and other limited geographic areas
might use these wireless communications to supplement other navigational data.
Indeed, DSRC may eventually function as another form of infrastructure supporting
applications that have yet to be conceived.
However, automated systems may also develop without DSRC. None of
today’s production vehicles and only a minority of today’s automated research
platforms are DSRC-capable.59 Other forms of connectivity—including cellularbased telematics—are increasingly common in production vehicles, are essential to
most automated vehicles, and are probably sufficient for many applications.60 For
these reasons, dedicated short-range communications are best understood as
complementary to automation.61
With or without DSRC, the three pathways to full automation—advanced
driver assistance systems, automated emergency intervention systems, and driverless
systems—are likely to support varied use cases and business cases.
Advanced driver assistance systems will likely remain the domain of
conventional automakers and their suppliers. The most advanced ADAS features will
likely debut as options on higher-end vehicle models and then filter down to lowercost models. Startup firms and individual hobbyists may also seek to modify
58. DSRC refers to the technologies and channels that enable the fast and reliable transfer of
information between vehicles (V2V), between a vehicle and part of the roadway infrastructure (V2I), or—
more broadly—between a vehicle and another transportation element (V2X). In the United States, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is moving toward likely requiring that new vehicles be
DSRC-capable. See generally Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communications, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., http://www.safercar.gov/v2v/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2016) (noting that V2V technology
“shows great promise in transforming the way Americans travel”). However, although the FCC allocated
part of the wireless spectrum exclusively for these transportation communications in 1999, it may decide
to open this space to unlicensed uses, including those that are unrelated to transportation. See, e.g., Middle
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-96, §§ 6101–02, 126 Stat. 156 (Feb. 22,
2012) (providing for the spectrum auction authority of the FCC); see also Michael O’Rielly, Comm’r,
FCC, The Road to Gigabit Wi-Fi: Can We Share the 5.9 GHz ‘Car Band’? (Jan. 12, 2016),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0112/DOC-337254A1.pdf (discussing
the implications of sharing the upper 5 GHz range with non-automotive users).
59. See Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2, at 89-90.
60. Cf. id. at 90 (referring to the use of cellular-based telematics in today’s vehicles for “emergency
assistance, vehicle monitoring, and the provision of entertainment and navigation services”).
61. Cf. id. (discussing how automated vehicles will depend on connection to real-world data like
DSRC vehicles).
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production vehicles by adding or changing these systems. If these systems rely on
complex roadway maps or other data that must be kept current, they may be offered
as subscription services.
These systems may have unique applications for trucks and buses.
Platooning could help trucking firms substantially reduce their fuel costs (because
vehicles traveling closer together generally experience less drag).62 Automated lane
centering could help bus drivers navigate tight corridors and carefully align their
vehicles with passenger platforms.63
Automated emergency intervention systems will likewise become more
common on conventional cars and trucks. As they become more widespread and if
their safety benefits are demonstrated, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration may move to require automakers to include these features in new
vehicles. Indeed, the European Union already requires automakers to equip all new
trucks and buses with advanced emergency braking systems and lane departure
warning systems.64 Although SAE International’s taxonomy of driving automation
expressly excludes automated emergency intervention systems from its conception
of automation,65 these systems should be understood as part of broader efforts that
may one day enable full automation.
Driverless systems are likely to be deployed and operated by private as
well as public actors. Both Google66 and Uber,67 for example, could conceivably
operate driverless taxi and delivery services. These delivery services might
complement or compete with others that use aerial drones or sidewalk robots.
University campuses, central business districts, business parks, military bases,
retirement communities, amusement parks, airports, and similar facilities may
provide or contract for on-demand shuttle services.68 And public or quasi-public
entities may operate automated systems as a supplement, alternative, or replacement
to conventional public transit.
In some ways, these systems may resemble conventional utilities: They will
require a complex digital infrastructure supported by physical elements like data
servers and maintenance depots. Customers will likely pay for the services they use
but may need to request extensions of the system into their private driveways,

62. See MICHAEL LAMMERT, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ASSESSING THE FUEL-SAVING
POTENTIAL
OF
SEMIAUTOMATED
TRUCK
PLATOONING
(June
2015),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/64133.pdf.
63. See Dave Demerjian, Look Ma, No Hands! Automated Bus Steers Itself, WIRED (Sept. 9, 2008,
11:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2008/09/look-ma-no-hand/; Press Release, Sara Yang, Media
Relations, Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Researchers Showcase Automated Bus that Uses Magnets to Steer
Through
City
Streets
(Sept.
5,
2008),
https://berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2008/09/05_autobus.shtml.
64. Safety in the Automotive Sector, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/
sectors/automotive/safety/index_en.htm (last updated Oct. 10, 2016).
65. SAE J3016, supra note 4; Smith, Lawyers and Engineers, supra note 45.
66. GOOGLE SELF-DRIVING CAR PROJECT, https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2016).
67. Press Release, Uber, Uber and Carnegie Mellon University: A Deeper Partnership (Sept. 9, 2015),
https://newsroom.uber.com/cmupartnership/.
68. Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2, at 3.
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parking lots, or drive-through facilities—roughly analogous to the last few meters of
an electrical connection.
For simplicity, these three pathways can be collapsed into two. Advanced
driver assistance systems and automated emergency intervention systems can both
be described as “something everywhere” automation that can do only some of the
driving—but under many conditions. In contrast, driverless systems can be described
as “everything somewhere” automation that can do all of the driving—but only
under specific conditions.69 Whereas “something everywhere” systems will largely
depend on large national markets, “everything somewhere” systems will depend
much more on local conditions.
This difference between “something everywhere” and “everything
somewhere” systems is central to the strategies discussed in the remainder of this
Article. The discussion that follows groups these strategies into three imperfect
categories: administration, law, and community.
IV.
A.

ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGIES

Prepare Government

Driving automation presents both challenges and opportunities for the
public sector. The bills introduced in many states narrowly approach both sides of
this ledger by focusing on the explicit regulation and implicit recruitment of
research-and-development testing. A broader strategy would provide state and local
agencies the impetus, the authority, and the resources to prepare for—and in some
cases to promote—automated systems. This part identifies five steps that
governments at all levels can undertake.
First, a government that wishes to encourage vehicle automation should
publicly identify a single point person for the topic. At the state level, this person
should have the authority and credibility to coordinate among the state’s various
administrative agencies, between the governor and the legislature, between federal
and state authorities, and between state and local authorities. Moreover, this person
should act as a liaison to the private sector. Companies and universities in the state
may already be engaged in potentially relevant work. And if a large or small
developer of automated systems is considering a jurisdiction for development,
demonstration, or deployment, it should know precisely whom in government to call.
Second, government actors should advance their understanding of the
relevant technologies, applications, and activities. This effort should involve not just
vehicle regulators but also state and local authorities responsible for transportation,
transit, parking, law enforcement, education, environmental protection, health and
human services, commerce, workforce development, land use, zoning, and planning,
among many others. Depending on the centrality of driving automation to their work,
this understanding could range from general awareness (subject to the important
caution that news reports and press releases are often misleading)70 to specific
proficiency. These authorities should also expect a similar level of understanding
from their contractors and consultants.
69. OECD, REGULATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 1, at 15.
70. Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2, at 2.
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Third, governments should cultivate broader expertise with respect to
complex technical and social systems. Regardless of whether specific proficiency in
the technical details of automated driving is practical or appropriate, governments
should enhance their ability to manage the abstract issues of automated driving. For
example, understanding arguments about the safety of an automated system may
require systems engineers who can ask key questions about the design process.
Similarly, anticipating challenges of and to automated driving may require social
scientists who can point to successes and failures of governance during previous
technological revolutions.
Fourth, governments should ensure that their planning processes begin to
account for automated driving. Long-term assumptions should be revisited for landuse plans, infrastructure projects, building codes, bonds, and budgets. Procurement,
which offers particular opportunities for encouraging automation, is discussed
below.71
Finally, governments should develop break-the-glass plans for responding
to automated driving incidents. Who will respond, and how? What relationships will
be essential to effective coordination? What evidence and information will need to
be preserved, and how? Especially if officials have publicly embraced the potential
of these technologies, how will they address any fear or outrage that result from a
high-profile crash, regardless of where it occurs? A government that addresses these
issues proactively and ultimately positively signals its credibility as a potential
technological partner.
These steps necessarily require resources. “In a sense, governments should
approach policymaking with the same philosophy underlying public support of
physical infrastructure and scientific research: Initiate what the private sector cannot
or will not do.”72 Many of the strategies described in this Article would entail public
dollars. At the same time, the bills introduced or passed in various statehouses are
far from free. Reports and rulemakings are expensive, especially if an agency has no
experience or expertise in advanced vehicle technologies. The Nevada DMV has
incurred significant cost in developing its initial regulatory regime,73 and California’s
ongoing rulemaking is likely many times more expensive.74 Private developers have
also focused time, money, and effort on defeating or otherwise influencing many
state efforts.75
B.

Prepare Infrastructure

Advanced driver assistance systems are mostly likely to be usable and
useful in areas with good infrastructure. While infrastructure, broadly conceived,
71. See infra part IV.C.
72. Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1, at 600.
73. How an (Automated Driving) Bill Becomes Law, THE CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Nov. 13,
2012),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/multimedia/how-autonomous-driving-bill-becomes-law-video
[hereinafter Automated Driving Bill Becomes Law].
74. For example, in 2013 the California DMV agreed to pay the University of California–Berkeley
$680,000 for assistance in developing automated driving regulations.
75. See, e.g., Automated Driving Bill Becomes Law, supra note 73; Justin Pritchard, How Google Got
States to Legalize Driverless Cars, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 30, 2014, 8:15 PM),
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/how-google-got-states-legalize-driverless-cars.
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encompasses all kinds of supporting systems and institutions, this part focuses on six
steps that governments can take with respect to the physical and the digital.
First, governments can prioritize the adequate maintenance of roadways
under their jurisdiction. Roads—even major ones—in much of the United States are
in poor condition.76 Highway lane markings used by some lanekeeping systems are
frequently faded or, worse, simply wrong. Potholes and other pavement deficiencies
that are unlikely to be detected or avoided by current lane centering systems can be
found even on major freeways. Debris and other foreign objects that could
conceivably confuse an automated emergency intervention system litter roads and
shoulders. Addressing these conditions could help to improve the effectiveness of
near-term automated systems.
Second, governments can ensure that their design policies for signs, traffic
signals, and pavement markings are sensible, clear, and—to the extent practical—
consistent across jurisdictions. As automated systems become more advanced, they
may begin processing more information about the driving environment. Sound
design—a goal of both the Manual and Uniform Traffic Control Devices (for the
United States)77 and the Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals (for much of
the rest of the world)—could make this task more manageable.
Third, governments can verify the implementation of these policies—in
other words, they can check that their signs, signals, and markings actually conform
to their design policies. Real-world implementation is far from standard (and, in
some cases, cannot be), but substantial discrepancies between policies and practices
could increase the chance of unwarranted assumptions or unexpected conditions. For
example, traffic signals that are carefully installed and maintained in accordance with
applicable design standards are much more likely to be correctly read by an
automated system than those that are not.
Fourth—and for similar reasons—governments can verify that roadway
personnel, including construction crews and emergency responders, are following
pertinent policies when they are working on or near active roadways. Although roads
cannot be made wholly predictable, limiting the frequency and magnitude of
potentially risky variations can help automated systems as well as road users
generally.
Fifth, governments can standardize their management of data concerning
roadways, traffic, incidents, and construction. Both the public and the private sector
play important roles in the collection, validation, and distribution of these data, which
may be used by some automated driving systems to proactively identify situations
where mapping updates or driver intervention will be needed.
Sixth, governments can update existing vehicle registration databases to
include information about a vehicle’s automation capabilities. This information may

76. See AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 2013 REPORT CARD FOR AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE 7
(2013) (assigning a marginal grade of D to roads), http://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/9780784478837.
77. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL
DEVICES
§ 1A.03
(2009),
http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/htm/2009/part1/
part1a.htm. Many states have their own particular implementation of these design best practices. See, e.g.,
WIS. DEP’T OF TRANSP., WISCONSIN MANUAL ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC CONTROL DEVICES (2009),
http://wisconsindot.gov/Pages/doing-bus/local-gov/traffic-ops/man
uals-and-standards/wmutcd/wmutcd.aspx.
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be useful in a variety of contexts, including administration of safety-based incentive
programs, collection of relevant safety data, and enforcement of traffic safety laws.
Consider, for example, a state that permits users of automated vehicles to text while
in those vehicles.78 If the registration database is properly updated (and perhaps
coordinated), a police officer will be able to determine if a texting driver is acting
lawfully by quickly running her license plate number.
Seventh, governments can coordinate with the U.S. Department of
Transportation on dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) policies and
opportunities. If the relevant agencies within the Department ultimately recommend
particular infrastructure changes to facilitate vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-toinfrastructure communication, governments that have been closely following this
topic may be able to move forward more quickly than those that have not. In the
meantime, governments that install or replace traffic signals, variable message signs,
and other electronic communications equipment should ensure that these
installations either include or can be easily retrofitted with DSRC capabilities. These
capabilities may be particularly useful to localized driverless systems.
Eighth, governments can encourage the deployment of robust wireless
communications networks, including cellular, wi-fi, and eventually DSRC.
Because many automated systems will require some form of connectivity,79
communities that proactively address concerns about capacity and coverage
(particularly in the case of urban canyons) may be better positioned to host or
implement localized driverless systems.
Ninth, governments can use existing congestion management tools,
including managed lanes,80 onramp metering, and traffic signal prioritization, to
create roadway conditions favorable to automated driving. By traveling together in
closely spaced platoons or by simply crashing less frequently, vehicles with
advanced driver assistance systems and emergency interventions systems could
eventually contribute less to congestion and emissions per mile traveled than
conventional vehicles. These benefits may justify giving these vehicles access to
priority lanes on freeways and at onramps, even if this raises equity concerns. The
case may be even stronger for exempting truly driverless systems that enable rides
to be shared by multiple passengers. Indeed, some municipalities already permit taxis
to operate where private vehicles are prohibited.81
Tenth, governments can emphasize elements of neighborhood
infrastructure that may be useful to some kinds of driverless systems. Lower speed
limits and modern traffic calming devices may create environments that are ideal for
driverless systems operating at pedestrian-friendly speeds. These systems could, in
turn, help slow down other vehicles using those same streets. Lanes for golf carts or,
under the right circumstances, bicycles might also be used by small, light-weight
78. See FLA. STAT. § 316.305(3)(b)(7) (2015); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165(7) (2014); see also
Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2.
79. Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2.
80. See
Managed
Lanes:
A
Primer
(last
modified
Oct.
20,
2015),
http://ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/managelanes_primer/ (explaining that managed lanes include highoccupancy vehicle lanes and toll lanes).
81. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY, SAFER MARKET STREET,
https://www.sfmta.com/projects-planning/projects/safer-market-street (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
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driverless vehicles operating at compatible speeds. Even sidewalks may be suitable
for delivery robots traveling no faster than a human walks.
C.

Plan Infrastructure

The significant uncertainty surrounding automated driving—particularly
the nature and timing of its impacts—makes transportation planning extremely
difficult.82 Driving automation could conceivably lead to lower capacities (because
of longer initial headways and less assertive behavior at intersections)83 or to higher
lane capacities (because of reduced headways, smoother flows, shorter lag times at
signals, and fewer crashes).84 Similarly, it could result in increased vehicle miles
traveled (because travel is cheaper, trips are longer, other modes are less competitive,
or vehicles have no occupants whatsoever)85 or in decreased vehicle miles traveled
(largely because ridesharing is more attractive and efficient).86 Pavement distress
could increase (as vehicles travel more frequently over a specific portion of the travel
lane) or decrease (as vehicles move more smoothly and avoid pavement
deficiencies). More localized traffic patterns and behaviors could also change in
unexpected ways as vehicles queue at major origins and destinations, make zerooccupancy trips in the nonpeak direction, or shift bottlenecks.87
This uncertainty has particularly significant implications for long-range
planning, including demand models, infrastructure plans, alternatives analyses, and
financial projections. These exercises may fail to accurately predict the magnitude
or even the direction of automation’s impacts. Moreover, their treatment of
automation—or the lack thereof—may occasion increased scrutiny by other actors,
including courts reviewing environmental impact statements or private investors
evaluating infrastructure bond offerings.
Governments cannot resolve this uncertainty, but they can begin to adjust
their planning processes by identifying and incorporating a wide range of new
automation scenarios. For example:
1.
2.

A metropolitan planning organization might consider the vehicle
miles traveled impact of shifting half of trips on flights of less than
500 miles to single-occupancy motor vehicles;
A transit agency might consider the financial impact of shifting
half of suburban bus trips to shared motor vehicles; and

82. See Bryant Walker Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation Demand, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1401, 1407 (2012) [hereinafter Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation].
83. JANE BIERSTEDT ET AL., EFFECTS OF NEXT-GENERATION VEHICLES ON TRAVEL DEMAND AND
HIGHWAY CAPACITY 4 (Jan. 2014).
84. See TODD LITMAN, VICTORIA TRANSP. POLICY INST., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE IMPLEMENTATION
PREDICTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSPORT PLANNING 4 (2015); ABDUL RAWOOF PINJARI ET AL.,
AUTOMATED VEHICLE INST., CTR. FOR URBAN TRANSP. RESEARCH, HIGHWAY CAPACITY IMPACTS OF
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES: AN ASSESSMENT 1–5 (Nov. 2013); ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, at xv.
85. See Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation, supra note 82, at 1409–1410; BIERSTEDT ET
AL., supra note 83, at 4; LITMAN, supra note 84, at 8; ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
86. See Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation, supra note 82, at 1410; LITMAN, supra note
84, at 8; RAPHAEL BARCHAM, GOLDMAN SCH. OF PUB. POLICY, UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, CLIMATE
AND ENERGY IMPACTS OF AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3 (June 2014).
87. See PINJARI ET AL., supra note 84, at 5–11.
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A municipality might consider the congestion impact of shifting
the origins or destinations of half of trips from parking facilities to
building entrances.

If appropriately qualified and contextualized, these stylized examples—
among many others—can focus discussions of assumptions as well as impacts.
Rather than relying on high and low estimates, governments might instead speak in
terms of probabilities and magnitudes. Likely scenarios with significant impacts, for
example, might justify more policy and planning attention than unlikely scenarios
with minor impacts or even likely scenarios with minor impacts.
D.

Leverage Procurement

Governments, particularly in cooperation with each other, can use their
purchasing power to expand the market for advanced driver assistance and advanced
emergency intervention systems.
States, counties, and municipalities in the United States own nearly 1.5
million cars, 500,000 buses, and another 1.5 million trucks.88 If the turnover rate for
these fleets is ten percent,89 then these governments purchase some 350,000 vehicles
annually—five times more each year than Tesla has sold in its entire existence.90
Because of contracts and concessions, the number of vehicles closely associated with
government services is likely even greater.
Particularly influential authorities could establish procurement policies or
preferences that favor advanced systems. These authorities might include the fleet
managers of larger states, the transit operators for larger regions, and the taxi
regulators in larger cities. They could also include smaller agencies acting in concert.
Collaboration is especially important in the case of transit, where low volumes and
high costs have likely slowed or discouraged some innovations.91
Purchasing only vehicles with advanced safety systems could entail higher
upfront costs for these public entities (or the private actors they regulate). However,
some of these upfront costs might be offset by reduced operating costs if these
systems actually do result in fewer crashes, greater fuel efficiency, and less wear and
tear. This is a promising, but nonetheless speculative, prospect.

88. See Table MV-7 Highway Statistics 2013: Publically Owned Vehicles, DEP’T OF TRANSP. FED.
HIGHWAY
ADMIN.
(Jan.
2015),
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2013/
mv7.cfm.
89. See generally P.S. Hu & M.Q. Wang, State Vehicle Fleets and their Potential Acquisition of
Alternative Fueled Vehicles under EPACT 507, at 11, http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/000/700/722/507.pdf
(unpublished manuscript) (estimating “the turnover [rate] in the state vehicle stock based on the annual
percentage of the business fleet that is replaced”) (emphasis omitted).
90. Press Release, Tesla Motors, Inc., Tesla Delivers 10,030 Vehicles in Q1 of 2015 (Apr. 3, 2015),
http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/tesla-delivers-10030-vehicles-in-q1-of-2015-nas
daq-tsla-2006611.htm.
91. Cf. NATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSIT RESEARCH, EVALUATION OF AUTOMATED VEHICLE
TECHNOLOGY FOR TRANSIT, (Jan. 2015), http://www.nctr.usf.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/77975Evaluation-of-Automated-Vehicle-Technology-for-Transit.pdf (“With the exception of Nova Bus/Volvo,
none of the bus manufacturers contacted have plans to add AV technology.”).
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Regardless, these policies could help to create economies of scale for
vehicle makers and their suppliers and to encourage the quicker introduction of
advanced systems into less expensive vehicles.
E.

Advocate for AEIS Mandates

In light of the potential safety benefits of automated emergency intervention
systems,92 state and local governments can push the federal government to move
more aggressively in promoting and ultimately requiring more of these systems on
new vehicles. NHTSA already has the authority and arguably the obligation to
address these systems, but Congress could expedite this process by adequately
funding NHTSA93 and by statutorily relaxing the level of scrutiny that federal courts
apply to the agency’s rules.94
In addition to advocating for federal action, states can also encourage
vehicle manufacturers to integrate more of these systems into more of their vehicles.
State courts are likely to be an important forum for arguments that more vehicles of
recent vintage should have included automated emergency intervention systems as
standard equipment. These arguments may be especially persuasive to judges and
juries when the injured person is a pedestrian or other bystander struck by an
inattentive driver.95
V.
A.

LEGAL STRATEGIES

Analyze Existing Law

Governments can begin to analyze and, as necessary, clarify existing law in
the context of automated driving. This bottom-up approach differs from the topdown approach of some early legislative efforts, which largely failed to meaningfully
engage with existing law.96 Indeed, because vehicle codes, insurance rules, and other
potentially relevant laws vary by jurisdiction, merely enacting a uniform “automated
driving law” without reference to these nuances could confuse as much as clarify.97

92. See supra Part III.C (discussing automated emergency intervention systems).
93. See generally THE NAT’L ACADS., THE SAFETY PROMISE AND CHALLENGE OF AUTOMOTIVE
ELECTRONICS: INSIGHTS FROM UNINTENDED ACCELERATION 123–29 (2012) (comparing NHTSA’s
funding and resources to other regulatory agencies including the Federal Aviation Administration, the
Federal Railroad Administration, and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration).
94. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor
Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 273–89 (1987).
95. Bryant Walker Smith, Proximity-Driven Liability, 102 GEO. L.J. 1777, 1797 (2014).
96. See generally Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 1, at 500–507
(discussing how Nevada, Florida, and California’s regulation of automated vehicles and bills pending in
other states do not fully solve many of the legal issues posed by automated vehicles).
97. See generally Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 1; UNIV. OF WASH.
TECH. LAW & POLICY CLINIC, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE LAW REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
ULC,
https://www.law.washington.edu/Clinics/technology/Reports/
AutonomousVehicle.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2016) (suggesting possible uniform regulation language,
but recognizing the need for each state to pass specific and more detailed regulations for automated
vehicles).
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The initial step should therefore be a legal audit or legal inventory to
identify and analyze every statute and regulation that could apply adversely or
ambiguously to automated driving. Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the
United States identifies many of these provisions, from general requirements of
prudent conduct to the specific New York rule that a driver must keep at least one
hand on the wheel.98 Laws that diverge from acceptable driving norms should be
particularly suspect. For example, some states prohibit drivers from crossing over a
double-yellow line but provide no exception when the driving lane is blocked.99
A thorough legal audit will look far beyond the rules of the road to all
relevant law, particularly in the case of truly driverless systems. These systems may
involve different kinds of vehicles, facilities, and business models. Accordingly,
governments should evaluate laws regarding particular vehicle types (including lowspeed vehicles, neighborhood electric vehicles, golf carts, personal transporters such
as the Segway, and electronic toys such as remote-control miniature cars), facility
types (including multiuse trails, bike lanes, sidewalks, and quasipublic areas such as
parking structures), service types (including ridesharing, carsharing, transportation
network companies, and traditional mass transit), and business types (including
dealerships, consumer insurance,100 and reinsurance). Local governments may play
a particularly important role in reviewing and crafting these legal regimes.101
A legal audit should also analyze existing legal tools for regulating
automated driving. In enacting “autonomous driving laws” that legislate specifics of
vehicle design, some U.S. states have largely ignored legal mechanisms already
available to them. Crucially, current state laws typically: (a) prohibit driving
recklessly and operating an unsafe vehicle; (b) direct or at least empower
departments of motor vehicles to register only safe vehicles and to revoke the
registration of unsafe vehicles; (c) require serious crashes to be reported; (d) impose
insurance requirements that cast private insurers as indirect regulators of vehicle
safety; (e) criminally punish some negligent conduct; and (f) provide civil remedies
in tort, product liability, and consumer protection law that can influence vehicle
design and operation.102 A full discussion of regulation is beyond the scope of this
Article;103 the key point is merely that governments already have flexible tools that,
when supported by sufficient resources and expertise, provide an attractive
alternative to new legislative prescriptions and restrictions.
A key aspect of existing law is enforcement discretion. Depending on the
particular jurisdiction, freeway speed limits, minimum following distances,
centerline restrictions, and general rules about vehicular interactions may be
routinely—and in some cases even necessarily—violated without penalty.
Understanding this discretion is important to understanding law in practice as well

98. Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 1, at 413.
99. Compare, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-1890 (1993) (providing no such exception), with N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:4-86 (West 1951) (providing such an exception).
100. See infra Part V.E (discussing consumer insurance).
101. See infra Part V.B (discussing local governments’ role in crafting these legal regimes).
102. See Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 1.
103. See Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1 (discussing regulation).
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as in theory.104 Furthermore, as discussed below,105 clarifying this discretion at all
levels of government can provide greater predictability to developers of automated
systems by reducing the potential for selective enforcement by individual officers.
B.

Calibrate Existing Law

If a legal audit does identify obstacles, ambiguities, or deficiencies in
existing law, the next step may be legal change. Depending on the particular issues
and legal structures, this change could occur through legislative act, administrative
regulation, executive order, legal interpretation, or policy statement, among other
mechanisms. Although the details should largely follow from the legal audit, the
following points may be useful.
First, public-private collaboration is prudent. Established companies
are—or should be—conducting their own legal research and development to
complement their technological research and development. If and when these
companies want legal change, they can be expected to ask for it.106 “Broad mandates
or basic conditions may be useful in driving or policing innovation, but attempts to
closely tailor rules to products that do not yet exist could produce law that is
premature and prejudicial.”107At the same time, governments should remain mindful
of market failures that do require intervention.108
Second, uniformity across jurisdictions may be desirable for massproduced vehicles, while tailored regimes may support pilots, demonstrations, and
local deployments. Rather than focusing on developing a uniform automated driving
law, governments could cooperate on standardizing or harmonizing more of their
underlying legal frameworks—particularly those that govern vehicles, drivers,
driving, insurance, dealerships, and commercial vehicle operations. To this end, state
governments might collectively reanimate the National Committee on Uniform
Traffic Laws and Ordinances (NCUTLO)109 or else locate similar functions in the
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), the American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), the Uniform
Law Commission (ULC),110 or another appropriate interstate organization.
Third, SAE International’s levels of automation, including the supporting
definitions, promote uniformity at a foundational level by providing a common

104. Judges and juries, however, might nonetheless continue to treat the nominal violation of these
laws as evidence of negligence or defect in a claim against the developer or operator of an automated
system.
105. See infra, Part V, F.
106. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-711(2)(b) (2015) (addressing following-distance
restrictions).
107. Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1, at 600.
108. See supra text accompanying note 61.
109. The NCUTLO released the most recent Uniform Vehicle Code in 2000, but “suspended
operations about [eight] years ago due to lack in funding.” Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably
Legal, supra note 1, at 417 n.11 (citing email from NCTULO’s former executive director to Bryant Walker
Smith).
110. UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, THE NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. L.,
http://www.uniformlaws.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2017).
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language for discussing (and conceivably regulating) a complex topic.111 A
government contemplating a new regulatory regime, for example, can avoid
ensnaring current and imminent advanced driver assistance systems by expressly
applying this regime to automation systems at or above SAE level three.112
Fourth, regulatory reciprocity can also achieve a form of uniformity. If
advancements in vehicle technologies ultimately compel novel registration or
licensing determinations, treating the favorable determinations of one jurisdiction as
conclusive in another could reduce the administrative difficulties that developers
might otherwise face.113 Reciprocity—or even unilateral recognition of another
jurisdiction’s system approvals—could also benefit smaller jurisdictions that lack the
consumer demand to motivate companies to enter the market or the public resources
to establish a holistic regulatory regime.
Fifth, and without neglecting the careful legal analysis described above,
legislatures could codify interpretive conventions to facilitate automation.
Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States offers language that
would clarify many potentially relevant provisions common to state vehicle codes.114
It also provides language to help establish a more reasonable interpretation of a
provision in the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traffic—which binds the United
States and many other countries—that might otherwise be viewed as inconsistent
with automated driving.115

111. See SAE J3016, supra note 4.
112. Cf. H.B. 1372, 2016 Leg. Sess. (Va. 2016) (“‘Autonomous vehicle’ means a vehicle, as defined
by levels 4 and 5 of SAE J3016, that utilizes an automated driving system that handles all aspects of the
dynamic driving task, and does not require the involvement of a driver at any time for [its] safe
operation.”). The U.S. states to have specifically regulated automated driving have achieved roughly the
same result through less precise language. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.025 (2013) (“Autonomous
technology” means technology which is installed on a motor vehicle and which has the capability to drive
the motor vehicle without the active control or monitoring of a human operator. The term does not include
an active safety system or a system for driver assistance, including, without limitation, a system to provide
electronic blind spot detection, crash avoidance, emergency braking, parking assistance, adaptive cruise
control, lane keeping assistance, lane departure warning, or traffic jam and queuing assistance, unless any
such system, alone or in combination with any other system, enables the vehicle on which the system is
installed to be driven without the active control or monitoring of a human operator.”); CAL. VEH. CODE
§ 38750(a)(1) (2015) (“‘Autonomous technology’ means technology that has the capability to drive a
vehicle without the active physical control or monitoring by a human operator.”).
113. See Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 1, at 508–17.
114. Id.
115. Compare Convention on Road Traffic art. 8, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 125 U.N.T.S. 3
(“Every vehicle or combination of vehicles proceeding as a unit shall have a driver” and “Drivers shall at
all times be able to control their vehicles . . . “), with Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal,
supra note 1, at 509 (“Geneva Convention. The Legislature hereby finds that automated operation of
vehicles under the conditions prescribed herein is consistent with article 8 of the Convention on Road
Traffic because (1) such operation has the potential to significantly improve highway safety, one of the
objects of the Convention; (2) this State shall make such operation reasonably knowable to the foreign
visitors contemplated by the Convention; (3) the Convention implicitly permits indirect control over
vehicles and animals; (4) there shall remain a licensed driver of each vehicle who shall be able to specify
or accept the parameters of operation; and (5) these parameters shall be consistent with the traffic laws of
this State.”).
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Sixth, establishing a legal distinction between driver and passenger
would simplify the legal framework for truly driverless systems.116 In a functional
sense, ordinary users of these systems are simply passengers, analogous to riders of
taxis, buses, and even elevators. Indeed, a forthcoming version of SAE
International’s levels of driving automation will likely reach a similar technical
conclusion.117 However, because U.S. states generally take an expansive view of the
concept of driver or operator,118 these users could conceivably be subject to awkward
legal qualifications, obligations, and liabilities intended to apply to conventional
drivers. To foreclose this possibility, governments could clarify that an individual
carried commercially on a vehicle designed to operate at or above SAE level four is
a passenger rather than a driver.119
Finally, and especially if they retain a broad legal definition of driver,
governments could expressly permit the use of otherwise prohibited electronic
devices in vehicles operating at or above SAE level three. Since these devices are
likely to be used anyway,120 this exemption might merely align law with actual
practice.121 Regardless, it could also enable more effective marketing of advanced
driver assistance systems to potential customers and facilitate new (and lawful)
business cases in the commercial sector.
More broadly, a government seeking to reconcile an existing legal regime
with automated driving technologies and applications might choose among several
drafting approaches. It could wholly revise an existing regime such as the vehicle
code with a view toward addressing both automated and conventional driving. It
could expressly restrict the existing regime to conventional driving and develop an
entirely new regime to apply to automated driving. Or it could develop a hybridized
package that uses definitions, interpretive guidance, clarifications, and other
mechanisms to map the existing regime onto automated driving. The choice of
approach may depend on the results of the legal audit, the maturity of the relevant
technologies, and the priorities of the jurisdiction.
These considerations are far from comprehensive. To reiterate, they are
directed at encouraging rather than regulating automated driving. They also largely
avoid potential product liability implications of increasing driving automation and
connectivity. Announcements over the last several years suggest that,
notwithstanding concerns they may have about product liability, major companies
are aggressively pursuing automated driving research and development. Although
uncertainty about liability could conceivably slow or limit the broad deployment of

116. See, e.g., Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 1, at 508–517.
117. See SAE J3016, supra note 4.
118. Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal, supra note 1, at 433–35.
119. See id. at 508–17 (suggesting potential legal language to draw this line).
120. See generally Distracted Driving, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 7, 2016),
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/distracted_driving/ (stating in the “CDC Research” section that
69 percent of drivers ages 18-64 reported talking on their cell phone while driving and 31 percent of
drivers ages 18-64 reported reading or sending text messages while driving in the 30 days preceding the
survey).
121. See Smith, Lawyers and Engineers, supra note 45.
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these technologies, their developers are in the best position to make and substantiate
any such arguments.122
C.

Enforce Safety Requirements

Enforcing existing laws regarding driver and vehicle safety could amplify
the advantages of automated driving in relation to conventional driving. Consider
five key examples:
Speed laws. Some (though by no means all) automated driving systems
might restrict vehicle speeds to at or below the legal speed limit. If most conventional
vehicles are exceeding that limit, this could create the perception that these systems
disadvantage their users. Greater enforcement of speed limits, however, could negate
that difference. Although automated speed enforcement is controversial, it can be
particularly effective.123
Distracted driving laws. Some U.S. states have exempted the “drivers” of
automated vehicles from prohibitions on texting and using potentially distracting
electronic devices124—and the previous part suggested that other jurisdictions
consider doing so. If aggressive enforcement of these prohibitions discourages
drivers of conventional vehicles from engaging in these (demonstrably unsafe125)
behaviors, then exemptions will provide real and perceived benefits to users of
automated vehicles.
Intoxicated driving laws. Drunk driving statistics126 suggest both an
appalling lack of personal responsibility and a dearth of alternatives to driving. Truly
driverless systems may provide such an alternative within those communities where
they are deployed. At least initially, the limited geographic reach of these systems
may reduce their utility to people who either reside in low-density areas or drink far
from where they live. Nonetheless, strengthening and more aggressively enforcing
intoxicated driving laws could encourage some would-be drunk drivers to rely
instead on those systems that are deployed and to create specific demand for systems
that have yet to be deployed. Moreover, such enforcement might help to discourage

122. See Bryant Walker Smith, Uncertain Liability, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (May 27, 2013, 5:25
PM), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/05/uncertain-liability; Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1,
at 599–600; Proximity-Driven Liability, supra note 95; Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and
Product Liability (forthcoming 2017), http://newlypossible.org.
123. See generally Steven A. Glazer, Those Speed Cameras Are Everywhere: Automated Speed
Monitoring Law, Enforcement, and Physics in Maryland, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 1–3, 18, 21 (2012)
(discussing advantages and disadvantages of automated enforcement).
124. See FLA. STAT. § 316.305(3)(b)(7) (2013) (exempting the drivers of automated vehicles from the
state’s texting ban); NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165(7) (2015) (excluding automated vehicles from the
definition of ‘operating a motor vehicle’ for the purposes of the ban on using a wireless communications
device while driving).
125. “In 2011, 3,331 people were killed in crashes involving distracted drivers and an estimated
additional 387,000 were injured in motor vehicle crashes involving distracted drivers.” U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: DISTRACTED DRIVING
2011 (2013), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811737.pdf.
126. See AMY BERNING ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS: RESULTS OF THE 2013-14 NATIONAL ROADSIDE SURVEY OF ALCOHOL AND
DRUG
USE
BY
DRIVERS
(2015),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/
nti/pdf/812118-Roadside_Survey_2014.pdf.
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those who are intoxicated from continuing to drive in the belief that advanced driver
assistance systems and emergency intervention systems will compensate for any
impairment.
Seatbelt laws. Automated driving systems might encounter situations, like
a bicyclist swerving to avoid an opened car door, that require rapid deceleration or
other abrupt maneuvers that may imperil vehicle occupants who are not belted.
Enforcing seatbelt laws could maximize the safety of the people both inside and
outside these vehicles. Governments could also update seatbelt laws that were
originally enacted when seatbelt usage was much less common. In many states, for
example, statutory or common law rules “restrict whether or for what purpose a
defendant automaker can introduce evidence that an injured plaintiff was not wearing
her seatbelt.”127 Allowing developers of automated driving systems to assume that
people who care about their safety will buckle up may help to ease some of the design
challenges that these developers face.128
Vehicle laws. Because of their original design, their subsequent
modification, or their insufficient maintenance, many vehicles on the road today are
dangerous—and not just to their occupants.129 Whether a pedestrian suffers minor
injuries or death, for example, might depend on the stopping distance of the vehicle
that strikes her, which in turn depends in part on the weight of that vehicle, the
condition of its tires, and the performance of its brakes. Similarly, pollution from
motor vehicles kills roughly 50,000 Americans every year,130 but only 25 percent of
vehicles account for 90 percent of this pollution.131 Many of these vehicles likely

127. Bryant Walker Smith, Tesla and Liability, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (May 20, 2015),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/05/tesla-and-liability. See also, e.g., Nabors Well Servs., Ltd. v.
Romero, 456 S.W.3d 553, 563 (Tex. 2015) (holding evidence of use or nonuse of seat belts is admissible
for apportioning responsibility among parties if plaintiff’s conduct was a cause of her damages); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A(d) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-13-106 (1987).
128. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 78 Fed. Reg. 53,386
(Aug. 29, 2013) (denying a petition by BMW “to amend the Federal motor vehicle safety standard on
occupant crash protection to permit optional certification using a seat belt interlock for front seat
occupants as an alternative to the unbelted crash test requirements”). And yet, interestingly, there are also
technological alternatives. Managers in two companies active in the development of automated vehicles
have explained to me that their vehicles will not operate, either in automated mode or at all, if the
occupants are not belted. See also Tesla and Liability, supra note 127.
129. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT OF
MOTOR
VEHICLE
CRASHES
2010
(REVISED)
(May
2015),
http://wwwnrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pubs/812013.pdf [hereinafter ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACT].
130. See Steven R.H. Barrett et al., Impact of the Volkswagen Emissions Control Defeat Device on US
Public Health: Supplementary Material, 10 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 114005 (2015). This is more than the
roughly 30,000 Americans who die in motor vehicle crashes every year. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2014 CRASH DATA KEY FINDINGS, DOT HS 812 219 (Nov.
2015), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/812219.pdf (“In 2014 there were 32,675 people killed in motor
vehicle crashes on U.S. roadways.”); Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Admin., NHTSA Confirms
Traffic
Fatalities
Increased
in
2012
(Nov.
14,
2013),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/NHTSA+Data+Confirms+Traffic+Fatalities+Inc
reased+In+2012.
131. Press Release, Univ. of Toronto, Traffic Emission May Pollute 1 in 3 Canadian Homes (Apr. 21,
2015), http://media.utoronto.ca/media-releases/traffic-emissions-may-pollute-1-in-3-canadian-homes/;
J.M. Wang et al., Plume-based Analysis of Vehicle Fleet Air Pollutant Emissions and the Contribution
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violate existing vehicle safety and pollution laws.132 Removing them from the road
could shift some travel demand to automated systems.
These five examples may require some legal changes. In particular, a
government may wish to authorize automated speed enforcement, exempt the users
of automated vehicles from some distracted driving provisions, mandate alcoholdetecting ignition locks in some situations, update seatbelt laws to reflect
contemporary norms, and create or improve a vehicle-testing regime.
D.

Internalize the Costs of Driving

Policies that make vehicle owners and operators bear the true cost of driving
will indirectly benefit any technologies that produce gains in fuel efficiency or safety.
Three key policies actions would help internalize these costs: raising fuel taxes,
reducing parking subsidies, and increasing insurance minimums.
Raising fuel taxes at the state and federal levels is the first of these
strategies. A recent model (which itself followed many other studies133) suggested
that driving imposes environmental damages of $3.80 per gallon of gasoline and
$4.80 per gallon of diesel.134 As that analysis recognizes,135 these costs are difficult
to define with precision. Even at the lower end of their ranges, however, they are
several times greater than current fuel taxes: On average, these state and federal taxes
add less than 50 cents to the cost of a gallon of gasoline and slightly more to the cost
of a gallon of diesel.136
Taxing fuel at a level that reflects these impacts could make fuel-efficient
vehicles more economically attractive to buyers. Automated driving could
conceivably increase fuel efficiency by reducing crashes, smoothing speeds and
flows, and enabling drag-reducing platoons.137 Any resulting difference in cost
between automated and conventional driving would not be a subsidy to the former
or a penalty to the latter; rather, it would reflect the actual difference in pollutionrelated damages.
This approach could be particularly relevant to truck automation. Fuel is
one of the largest single expenses in trucking;138 a typical combination tractor uses
from High Emitters, 8 ATMOSPHERIC MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES 2881, 2894 (2015). These statistics
predate revelations about Volkswagen’s use of defeat devices.
132. See. Wang et al., supra note 131.
133. See Drew T. Shindell, The Social Cost of Atmospheric Release, 130 CLIMATIC CHANGE 313, 314
(2015).
134. Id. at 321.
135. Id.; see also, e.g., Ian W.H. Perry, Is Gasoline Undertaxed in the United States?, 148 RESOURCES
28, 29 (2002), http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-Resources-148-gasoline.pdf (explaining that, while
economists have tried to calculate the economic damages from carbon emissions, these numbers are
speculative at best).
136. For a breakdown of the motor fuel taxes by state, see State Motor Fuel Taxes, AM. PETROLEUM
INST. (Oct.. 2016), http://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Statistics/StateMotorFuel-OnePagers-Oct-2016.pdf
On average, state and federal taxes add 48 cents per gallon to the price of gasoline and 54 cents per gallon
to the price of diesel. Id.
137. ANDERSON ET AL, supra note 1, at 28.
138. W. FORD TORREY, IV & DAN MURRAY, AM. TRANSP. RES. INST., AN ANALYSIS OF THE
OPERATIONAL COSTS OF TRUCKING: A 2014 UPDATE (Sept. 2014), http://www.atri-online.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/ATRI-Operational-Costs-of-Trucking-2014-FINAL.pdf (explaining that fuel
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some $70,000 to $125,000 of diesel annually.139 This means that reducing a truck’s
fuel use by ten percent—which automation in combination with platooning might
enable140—could save nearly $10,000 per year.141 Doubling total fuel taxes would
increase this differential to more than $11,000.142 In a low-margin business such as
trucking,143 even this small difference could be significant.
Governments could also use taxation more strategically to ensure a price
floor for fuel.144 Automatically raising fuel taxes when pretax prices drop below a
particular level could prevent the price dips that might otherwise discourage longterm investment in more fuel-efficient systems, including the technologies needed
for automation and platooning.
Although usage taxes can lead to a more efficient allocation of resources,145
they can also raise equity concerns. In the United States, lower-income households
that rely on driving as a primary mode of transportation typically pay more of their
total income in fuel taxes than higher-income households.146 However, these fuel
taxes could be directed to support other programs—including public transportation,
travel vouchers, and income assistance—that assist the less affluent. This is a crucial

costs account for 38% of total annual carrier costs). For current diesel prices, see U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., GASOLINE AND DIESEL FUEL UPDATE, https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/ (last updated
Mar. 14, 2016).
139. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR HEAVY TRUCKS
(June
2009),
https://www1.eere.energy.gov/vehiclesandfuels/pdfs/truck_efficiency
_paper_v2.pdf; cf. also WHITE HOUSE, IMPROVING THE FUEL EFFICIENCY OF AMERICAN TRUCKS—
BOLSTERING ENERGY SECURITY, CUTTING CARBON POLLUTION, SAVING MONEY AND SUPPORTING
MANUFACTURING
INNOVATION
(Feb.
2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/finaltrucksreport.pdf (“[E]very mile per gallon gained in fuel economy is worth
thousands of dollars in fuel cost savings per [Class 8] truck per year.”); OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., 2015
VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT ch. 3 (2015), http://cta.ornl.gov/vtmarketreport/
pdf/chapter3_heavy_trucks.pdf (truck fuel efficiency); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
ANNUAL VEHICLE DISTANCE TRAVELED IN MILES AND RELATED DATA—2013 (1) BY HIGHWAY
CATEGORY
AND
VEHICLE
TYPE,
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/
2013/vm1.cfm (truck fuel use); TORREY & MURRAY, supra note 138 (trucking costs).
140. LAMMERT,, supra note 62 (finding that platooning resulted in fuel savings for the trailing truck
of up to 9.7%).
141. Ten percent of $70,000 to $125,000 is $7,000 to $12,500. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note
139.
142. See, e.g., JORDI BADIA CANAL, FUEL SAVING POTENTIALS OF HDVS THROUGH PLATOONING
BASED ON REAL GPS TRACES (XR-EE-RT 2014:008) 33–41 (Mar. 2014) (Master’s Degree Project,
Stockholm,
Sweden),
http://upcommons.upc.edu/bitstream/handle/2099.1/22743/
Report.pdf?sequence=4 (focusing on the potential benefits in fuel consumption for heavy duty vehicles
through platooning and estimating that this could save 10% in fuel costs). See also LAMMERT,, supra note
62. For current diesel tax rates, see AM. PETROLEUM INST., DIESEL TAX, http://www.api.org/oil-andnatural-gas-overview/industry-economics/fuel-taxes/diesel-tax (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
143. N.Y.U. STERN SCH. OF BUS., MARGINS BY SECTOR (US) (Jan. 2016),
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/margin.html.
144. See Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed
Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5 (2010).
145. See Arnold C. Harberger, Taxation, Resource Allocation, and Welfare, ROLE OF DIRECT AND
INDIRECT TAXES IN FED. RES. SYS. 25 (1964).
146. THOMAS STERNER, FUEL TAXES AND THE POOR: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF GASOLINE
TAXATION AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE POLICY [PG #] (EDITOR, EDITION 2011).
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point: Although the transportation system is far from optimal, transportation itself is
essential.
More broadly, efficiency and equity are just two considerations in ongoing
debates about raising, indexing, and replacing fuel taxes.147 Automated driving,
however, also belongs in those debates.
Reducing parking subsidies is the second way that governments—
particularly local governments—can better align the individual and social costs of
motor vehicle travel. More precisely, many cities subsidize private vehicle
ownership by providing inexpensive on-street parking (especially in residential
areas) and by requiring new buildings to include more parking spots than the market
demands.148 Cheap and plentiful parking encourages both vehicle ownership and
vehicle usage.149 Conversely, making parking more expensive and less convenient
could encourage the use of driverless systems that forgo parking altogether or,
perhaps, advanced driver assistance systems that automate the driving task in part
(such as park assist) or in whole (such as automated valet).
Finally, raising insurance minimums may help to translate safety gains
from automated driving into financial terms that are obvious to vehicle owners and
drivers. The cost of a serious injury crash far exceeds the third-party liability
coverage that nearly every state150 requires vehicle owners and operators to carry.
Depending on the methodology used, a single traffic death costs somewhere between
$1.5 and $10 million.151 And yet in most states, the at-fault driver could lawfully
have an insurance policy that would pay out no more than $50 thousand—a
hundredth of this cost.152 In short, these minimums are far too minimal.153

147. THE TRANSP. RESEARCH BD. OF THE NAT’L ACAD.., THE FUEL TAX AND ALTERNATIVES FOR
TRANSPORTATION FUNDING, SPECIAL REP. 285, at 65–66 (2006) http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/sr/
sr285.pdf.
148. Victoria Transp. Policy Inst., Parking Solutions: A Comprehensive Menu of Solutions to Parking
Problems, TDM ENCYCLOPEDIA (last updated Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.vtpi.org/tdm/tdm72.htm.
149. But see id.
150. The one exception is New Hampshire. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:3 (1989).
151. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN, supra note 129, at 1, 44; NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL,
ESTIMATING
THE
COSTS
OF
UNINTENTIONAL
INJURIES
2013,
at
1
(2015),
http://www.nsc.org/NSCDocuments_Corporate/estimating-costs-unintentional-injuries-2015.pdf.
152. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-7-6(c) (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104(b) (2013); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 10-4-620 (2003); D.C. CODE § 31-2406(a)(2A)(c) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-711(a)(1)(A)(2009); IDAHO CODE § 49-1229(2) (2009); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7-203. (2015); IND. CODE
§ 9-25-4-5(2) (1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3107(e) (1984); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-110(1)(a)(1)
(West 1986); MISS. CODE ANN. § 63-15-3(j) (2015); MO. REV. STAT. § 303.190(2)(2) (1999); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 61-6-103(1)(b) (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. §60-346 (2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:20
(1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-5-208(B) (2012); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 333 (b) (1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-16.1-11(2)(b) (2003); OKLA. STAT. 4509.20(H) (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 806.070(2)(b)
(2010); 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-1(A)(3) (1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-140(A)(2) (2006); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 32-25-70 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-12-102(12)(A)(i)(a)-(b) VT. STAT. ANN. 23
11 § 800(a) (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-472(3) (1989) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.29.090(1)
(1963); WIS. STAT. § 344.33(2)(b) (2015); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 31-9-103(b)(ii) (1957).
153. In contrast, German law requires at least €1 million in third-party liability coverage for personal
injury. Haftpflichtversicherung [Ordinance on the Surveillance Industry], Jan. 1, 1996,
Bewachungsverordnung [BewachV] at 362 § 6 (Ger.).; see also Pflichtversicherungsgesetz [Compulsory
Insurance Act], Apr. 5, 1965, BGBI I at 213, § 4 (Ger.).
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Recent (and distinct) efforts to regulate automated driving and ridesharing
suggest the absurdly low level of these minimums. In Nevada and California,
developers that wish to test their automated driving systems on public roads must
secure or demonstrate the ability to cover $5 million in crash liability.154 And several
states to expressly regulate so-called transportation network companies like Uber
and Lyft have imposed insurance requirements several times higher than those
imposed on noncommercial drivers.155
Raising insurance minimums would likely raise premiums for this
insurance, which could in turn raise the cost of owning and operating a vehicle. This
could have some undesirable effects: These cost increases could disproportionately
impact lower-income households and might also encourage more drivers to
unlawfully forgo insurance. It is important to note, however, that as with raising fuel
taxes, raising insurance minimums would not raise the cost of driving in universal
terms; it would merely shift some costs from those who are actually injured to those
who could potentially cause injury.
Automated systems are expected to reduce the frequency and severity of
this injury.156 Indeed, both the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and
the National Transportation Safety Board have recently moved to encourage the
deployment of some active safety systems.157 If these expected safety gains are
realized, then the costs of insuring against injuries and deaths related to automated
driving may be lower than the corresponding costs for conventional driving.
Ensuring that insurance minimums more fully reflect these costs could increase the
potential cost difference in a way that would be favorable (and fair) to the owners
and users of automated driving systems.
Raising these minimums could also help address one of the product liability
concerns associated with increasing automation. The growing prevalence of
advanced driver assistance systems and automated emergency intervention systems
means that a greater share of crashes may be linked, however minimally or
implausibly, to some aspect of vehicle design or performance.158 As a result, even in
a crash caused primarily by a human driver’s negligence, the companies that
designed, manufactured, or sold the vehicle or its relevant components could face
litigation.159 These automotive manufacturers are often more attractive defendants

154. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 482A.060 (2013); CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 38750(b)(3) (2015).
155. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5433(b)(2) (West 2015) (requiring “transportation network companies”
to provide at least $1,000,000 of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage from the moment a
passenger enters a vehicle to the moment the passenger exits the vehicle).
156. Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Department of Transportation
Releases Policy on Automated Vehicle Development NHTSA 14-13 (May 30, 2013),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+Department+of+Transportation+Releases+
Policy+on+Automated+Vehicle+Development.
157. See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BOARD, SPECIAL INVESTIGATION REP.: THE USE OF FORWARD
COLLISION AVOIDANCE SYSTEMS TO PREVENT AND MITIGATE REAR-END CRASHES 37-38 (May 19,
2015), http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR1501.pdf.
158. See, e.g., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA’S 2014 AUTOMATIC EMERGENCY
BRAKING
TEST
TRACK
EVALUATIONS
DOT
HS
812
166
(June
2015),
http://www.nhtsa.gov/DOT/NHTSA/NVS/Crash%20Avoidance/Technical%20Publications/
2015/812166-2014AutomaticEmergencyBrakingTestTrackEval.pdf.
159. This depends on the particular U.S. state.
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than individual owners in part because they may be able to pay plaintiffs much more
than an individual’s third-party liability insurance would cover.
Requiring vehicle owners and operators to carry insurance in the millions
rather than the thousands of dollars would lessen this discrepancy. For a variety of
reasons, manufacturers would still face litigation: Their products may in fact be
defective, they may be less sympathetic than individual drivers, multiple defendants
may increase a plaintiff’s chance of recovery, or the negligent driver and the injured
plaintiff may be one and the same. At the same time, however, proving that a driver
was negligent may be easier than proving that a product was defective.160 More
broadly, ensuring that individuals can pay for the harms they inflict may reduce the
extent to which developers of automated systems need to pay as well.
In short, raising insurance minimums can help consistently internalize the
costs of crashes, which in turn can help automated driving compete fairly with
conventional driving.161 Rationalizing insurance—a strategy discussed in the next
part—can enhance both the accuracy and the precision of this effort.
E.

Rationalize Insurance

Insurance companies will play a key role in establishing the safety and
desirability of automated driving. “[B]etter tailor[ing] their products to reflect the
actual risk posed by particular drivers in particular vehicles in particular conditions”
could “advantage those automated vehicles that actually represent a safety
improvement.”162 Governments can assist by facilitating access to key data and by
providing flexibility to insurers as well as to the insured.
States tend to closely regulate automotive insurance.163 Vehicle owners are
generally required to carry at least third-party liability insurance (or show the means
to insure themselves).164 Providers of this insurance are subject to a wide range of
requirements, including restrictions on the rates they may charge.165 In general, these
insurers must be able to demonstrate to regulators that their proposed or actual rates
are not “excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory.”166 These arguments can
turn on concrete data, which may be lacking for new applications such as automated

160. This may be counterintuitive, particularly since products liability is often described as “strict.”
See David P. Griffith, Note, Products Liability—Negligence Presumed: An Evolution, 67 TEX. L. REV.
851, 853 (1989). In many jurisdictions, however, a plaintiff claiming a design defect must point to a
particular design change that, if adopted, would have prevented or reduced the particular injury without
diminishing the product’s overall safety. This can be a difficult hurdle. See, e.g., Branham v. Ford Motor
Co., 390 S.C. 203, 220–25, 701 S.E.2d 5, 14-17 (2010) (“This presentation of an alternative design must
include consideration of the costs, safety and functionality associated with the alternative design.”),
superseded by statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15–38–15 (2014).
161. This is also the goal of a more dramatic proposal to embrace enterprise liability. See Smith, Risk
of Inaction, supra note 1, at 606–07. That proposal, however, is beyond the scope of the instant Article.
162. Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1, at 598.
163. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-77-10 (1997).
164. Peterson, supra note 19, at 111–13; see also supra (discussing these minimums).
165. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 1343–44.
166. Id.
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driving167 and usage-based insurance.168 A dearth of these data could frustrate
insurers seeking either to satisfy regulatory requirements or merely to accurately
price their own risks.169
A state conducting a legal audit170 should consider whether existing law
obscures the data or distorts the economics of automated driving. Relevant
provisions may require actuarial data that are not practically available,171 limit the
collection of driving data,172 or restrict the use of those data in setting rates.173
California, for example, prohibits usage-based insurance174 and mandates specific
insurance rating factors, some of which may be less relevant at higher levels of
driving automation.175 The key here, as in the next part, is to provide flexibility
commensurate with both the risks and the opportunities of automated driving.
F.

Embrace Flexibility

No legislature, agency, or developer will be able to anticipate every legal
complication that might arise in the case of particular automated driving technologies
or applications. For this reason, governments should consider how best to provide
interpretations and clarifications of existing law and, as necessary, to grant
appropriate exceptions to and exemptions from that law.
Governments should consider whether and how they might use a variety of
legal mechanisms, including legislative acts, administrative regulations, executive
orders, legal interpretations, and policy statements, to address any obstacles or
uncertainties suggested by existing law. In some instances, formally amending a
statute may be the only way to clearly and correctly accommodate a particular
automated driving application. In other instances, however, less formal means may
be as effective. For example, depending on the state, the legislature, the department
167. Id. at 1345 (“Rating a new technology with an unproven track record may include a considerable
amount of guesswork.”).
168. See NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMM’RS (NAIC), CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES., USAGE-BASED
INSURANCE AND TELEMATICS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_usage_based_insurance.htm (last
updated June 6, 2016).
169. See Peterson, supra note 19, at 1345.
170. See supra.
171. Cf. Randall Guensler et al., Current State Regulatory Support for Pay-As-You Drive Automobile
Insurance
Options
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://transportation.ce.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/files/current_state_regulatory_sup
port_for_pay-as-you-drive_automobile_insurance_options.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2016).
172. Cf. Event Data Recorders, 49 C.F.R. § 563 (2015); The Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders 4 (Feb. 11, 2013), https://epic.org/privacy/edrs/EPICCoal-NHTSA-EDR-Cmts.pdf (discussing state limits on insurer access to in-vehicle event data recorders);
Nat’l Conference of State Legis., Privacy of Data from Event Data Recorders: State Statutes,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-of-data-fromevent-data-recorders.aspx (last updated Jan. 4, 2016) (discussing federal and state laws restricting access
to recorded event data).
173. DIMITRIS KARAPIPERIS ET AL., CIPR STUDY: USAGE-BASED INSURANCE AND VEHICLE
TELEMATICS: INSURANCE MARKET AND REGULATORY IMPACTS 20 (Mar. 2015).
174. Id. at 5, 73, 76.
175. Because of a ballot initiative, California requires insurers to use an insured’s driving safety
record, annual miles driven, and years of driving experience as the top three factors for setting a rate. CAL.
INS. CODE § 1861.02 (West 2016).
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of motor vehicles, the highway patrol, or the attorney general may play a role in
defining the “driver” of an automated vehicle for the purpose of a particular legal
regime.
The enforcement discretion already employed by government agencies
and agents is an informal means of providing flexibility—as well as a potential
source of significant uncertainty. For example, two state vehicle inspectors may
disagree on whether a particular vehicle is “safe” for the purposes of vehicle
registration, and two local police chiefs may disagree on whether a motorist should
be stopped or cited under any of the traffic code provisions with a potentially unclear
application to automated driving.176 Governments can manage this discretion by
clarifying enforcement priorities, practices, and parameters. Especially when linked
with the public network of support described below,177 this policy guidance can
highlight jurisdictions that are especially receptive in practical terms to automated
driving.
Recognizing and even formalizing a robust statutory or regulatory
exemption authority may also provide developers with prospective certainty
without reducing the flexibility available to them. This could be particularly
important for limited deployments of truly driverless vehicles in particular
communities. These deployments may reveal unanticipated legal hurdles that could
be addressed at least initially through waivers rather than wholescale reform.178 In
turn, the legal and practical lessons from these deployments can inform whatever
broader reforms eventually do occur.
Some federal agencies already have explicit if limited authority to create
exceptions to generally applicable law. The U.S. Department of Transportation, for
example, “may exempt, on a temporary basis, motor vehicles from a motor vehicle
safety standard . . . on terms the Secretary considers appropriate.”179 Indeed, the
Department’s January 2016 announcement on automated and connected vehicle
technologies specifically “encouraged manufacturers to submit requests for use of
the agency’s exemption authority.”180 European governments have also relied
heavily on exemptions to facilitate the research-and-development testing of
automated driving.181 Expanding explicit exemption authority can provide more
flexibility.

176. Smith, supra note 1, at 494–97, 498–500.
177. See infra.
178. Smith, supra note 2.
179. 49 U.S.C. § 30113; see also 49 U.S.C. § 30114.
180. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Secretary Foxx Unveils President Obama’s FY17 Budget
Proposal of Nearly $4 Billion for Automated Vehicles and Announces DOT Initiatives to Accelerate
Vehicle Safety Innovations (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/secretaryfoxx-unveils-president-obama%E2%80%
99s-fy17-budget-proposal-nearly-4-billion; see also U.S. Dep’t of Transp. & Nat’l Highway Traffic
Safety Admin., “DOT/NHTSA Policy Statement Concerning Automated Vehicles” 2016 Update To
“Preliminary
Statement
Of
Policy
Concerning
Automated
Vehicles,”
http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Autonomous-Vehicles-Policy-Update-2016.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2016).
181. See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. (London), The Pathway to Driverless Cars: Summary Report and
Action
Plan
(Feb.
2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/401562/pathway-driverless-cars-summary.pdf;
GOV’T
OF
THE
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This authority can also be implicit. “Unless a statute or regulation employs
‘extraordinarily rigid’ language, courts recognize an administrative law principle that
allows agencies to create unwritten exceptions to a statute or rule for ‘de minimis’
matters.”182 Significant statutory deviations for substantial undertakings, however,
may fall outside this principle. “The ability to create a de minimis exemption ‘is not
an ability to depart from the statute, but rather a tool to be used in implementing the
legislative design.’”183
Finally, public safety cases might be part of a more formal process for
granting significant exceptions to statutory or regulatory regimes.184 In short, a
government might require a developer seeking a specific legal exemption to
“publicly make and defend arguments about how well its system should perform and
how well its system actually performs.”185 Such a process could encourage the
sharing of information, the informal development of fluid best practices, and the
technical education of regulators as well as the general public.
VI.
A.

COMMUNITY STRATEGIES

Identify Local Needs and Opportunities

A community that wants to attract or implement a truly driverless system
should demonstrate that it is a strong candidate for such a system. For example, “lowspeed, low-mass, geographically restricted, and centrally supervised” systems “could
be particularly well suited for airports, city centers, business clusters, university
campuses, convention centers, military bases, retirement communities, amusement
parks, and last-mile transit applications. Small robotic trucklets could similarly
facilitate on-demand and last-mile freight delivery” in dense environments.186 Even
more specifically, a community should be able to articulate how an automated system
would solve entrenched problems or create new possibilities.
To a lesser extent, the community might also document how its conditions
could advance the state of the technologies themselves. For example, extreme

NETHERLANDS, MOBILITY, PUBLIC TRANSPORT AND ROAD SAFETY: SELF-DRIVING VEHICLES
https://www.government.nl/topics/mobility-public-transport-and-road-safety/contents/self-drivingvehicles (last visited Oct. 29, 2016); see also, e.g., NAT’L TRANSP. COMM’N (Australia), CURRENT
PROJECTS/PREPARING
FOR
MORE
AUTOMATED
ROAD
AND
RAIL
VEHICLES,
http://www.ntc.gov.au/current-projects/preparing-for-more-automated-road-and-rail-vehicles
(last
visited Oct. 29, 2016).
182. Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466, 491 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Greenbaum v. EPA, 370 F.3d 527, 534 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also AARP v. EEOC, 390 F. Supp. 2d 437
(E.D. Pa. 2005); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 82 F.3d 451, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
183. Envtl. Def. Fund, 82 F.3d at 466 (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360 (D.C. Cir.
1979)).
184. See Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1, at 600-602; see also Smith, New Years Resolutions,
supra note 3.
185. Smith, Risk of Inaction, supra note 1, at 601; see also Bryant Walker Smith, Third Annual
Conference on Governance of Emerging Technologies, Developing Danger, at 5 (May 2015),
http://conferences.asucollegeoflaw.com/get2015/files/2014/06/Walker-Smith-Developing-Danger.pdf;
Bryant Walker Smith, Regulating Automated Driving, TRB-AUVSI Automated Vehicles Symposium, at
12 (July 2015), http://newlypossible.org/files/presentations/2015-07-21_TRB-AUVSI_Regulation.pdf.
186. Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2, at 2-3.
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weather, atypical road users, and unusual infrastructure will all challenge automated
systems (and their designers). However, a community that carefully analyzes
automated driving in the context of its local transportation needs will be far more
interesting to developers than a community that merely announces—to the surprise
of no one—that it has snow.
A thoughtful local plan could inform subsequent proposals to or even
stimulate interest from a variety of public and private actors. Federal and state
agencies—including the U.S. Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban
Development, Energy, and Defense—may have relevant grants focused on transit,
technology, urban renewal, and energy efficiency.187 An enthusiastic Congress (or
state legislatures) might fund fifty “Smart Cities” rather than just one.188 Private real
estate developers may embrace driverless systems as centerpieces for new mixeduse projects. Institutional investors familiar with parking and toll facilities may look
to expand their investment portfolios. Developers of automated systems, including
startups and universities, may seek new environments in which to test their systems.
Most significantly, the companies that ultimately launch these systems are
likely to target select communities before expanding incrementally to others. Indeed,
companies like Google, Uber, and Amazon have embraced this geographic
strategy.189 Just as Google ran a competition to select its Fiber cities,190 a company
launching a driverless system might invite communities to compete to become a
showcase for its system.
A community that brings together local stakeholders to preemptively
develop such a proposal could also discover compelling business cases that may not
require external support. When vendors begin seriously marketing mature driverless
shuttle systems, some of these stakeholders may become early customers.
B.

Identify Allies and Constituencies

A government that wants to signal its support for automated driving should
identify both public and private networks of support.
The public network should document a chain of support from the governor
to the legislature to the department of motor vehicles to the local chief of police. A
credible statement of uniform policy down and across the entire hierarchy of relevant
government will reassure developers that, for example, an enthusiastic municipal
187. See Smart City Challenge, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transportation.gov/smartcity
(last updated Feb. 12, 2016); U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., CAPITAL INVESTMENT
PROGRAM , https://www.transit.dot.gov/funding/grant-programs/capital-investments/about-program (last
visited Mar. 15, 2016) (outlining New Starts grant); TIGER Discretionary Grants, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
https://www.transportation.gov/tiger (last updated Mar. 8, 2016); Dwight David Eisenhower
Transportation Fellowship Program, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/tpp/ddetfp.htm (last modified Mar. 4, 2016).
188. See Smart City Challenge, supra note 187.
189. See, e.g., EXPANSION PLANS, supra note 13 (discussing the cities Google Fiber is available in and
how Google decides what cities to expand to next); Martin Bryant, Hitting the Ground: What it Takes to
Launch Uber, Hailo and Citymapper in a New City, TNW NEWS (July 28, 2014, 7:25 pm),
http://thenextweb.com/entrepreneur/2014/07/28/hitting-ground-takes-launch-uber-hailo-cityma
pper-new-city/ (explaining how Uber decides to expand to a new city).
190. See Think Big with a Gig: Our Experimental Fiber Network, GOOGLE (Feb. 10, 2010),
https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/think-big-with-gig-our-experimental.html.

2017

HOW GOVERNMENTS CAN PROMOTE AUTOMATED DRIVING

135

position will not be preempted by a protectionist legislature or skeptical sheriff. The
Arizona governor’s executive order on automated driving exemplifies a top-down
approach,191 while the proclamations of several local governments in Iowa reflect a
bottom-up approach.192 A comprehensive approach should encompass these levels
plus everything in between.
The private network should involve key interest groups, companies, and
even individuals who could advocate for, and possibly collaborate with, developers
of automated driving systems. Disability-rights groups and downtown business
associations may help to educate and excite the community about driverless systems.
Universities, military bases, and planned real-estate developments may provide
attractive sites for initial deployment. Hospitals and other major employers that
routinely face issues related to parking and congestion may also contribute
financially, whether directly or indirectly, to such a deployment. And locally
prominent insurance companies may be able to allay some concerns about physical
or financial risk. This network would serve both a substantive role (by generating
support) and a symbolic one (by evidencing that support).
C.

Prepare Society

Governments should begin to anticipate and manage the broader
implications of automation and connectivity. This requires stepping back and
thinking ahead rather than merely chasing each particular technology as it develops.
Indeed, even though automated vehicles are likely to be a particularly prominent
symbol of the next technological revolution, they will be far from the only one. Basic
social science research can help governments and their constituents understand the
policy choices that these technologies will present. Robust structures for managing
unemployment and underemployment can help ease economic transitions for
individuals and industries. Informed discussion of these technologies can help to
appropriately manage public expectations.193
Planning of this kind is one of the most important contributions that
governments can make to automated driving in the long term. The status quo is far
from perfect. Automated driving may address some of today’s problems while
exacerbating others. Similarly, automated driving may be advantaged by some of
those problems but disadvantaged by others. Understanding these issues—which
may not necessarily be a priority for the companies developing and deploying
relevant technologies—will help governments determine the role that automated
driving can play in advancing larger public policy goals.

191. Exec. Order No. 2015-09, Self-Driving Vehicle Testing and Piloting in the State of Arizona; SelfDriving Vehicle Oversight Commission [M15-241], 22 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 87 (Jan. 15, 2016),
http://apps.azsos.gov/public_services/register/2016/3/26_governor_EO.pdf.
192. See Jack O’Leary & Marco Santana, Iowa County Says Yes to Driverless Cars, USA TODAY (July
25, 2014, 2:10 pm), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/07/25/iowa-driverlesscars/13159845/.
193. See generally Smith, Three Misconceptions, supra note 2.
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Be Public

Governments should share the steps they are taking to promote (as well as
to anticipate and regulate) automated driving. In other words, they should say what
they are doing.
Some states have worked to publicize their automated driving efforts. The
Nevada and California departments of motor vehicles, for example, both maintain
websites for their relevant regulatory activities.194 Florida’s Department of
Transportation conducts an annual symposium on this topic.195 The state of Michigan
has invested heavily in a new partnership among government, academia, and
industry devoted, in part, to automated and connected vehicles.196 The American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators maintains a useful repository of
information on relevant law.197
At the same time, governments can do much more. States can and should
identify the point person recommended above.198 Official websites should
meaningfully engage key audiences—not only the public at large but also established
developers, startups, insurers, local governments, advocacy organizations, and
would-be buyers, partners, and users. Governments should emphasize what they are
doing as well as how others can contribute to or benefit from these efforts.
This communication is important for at least four reasons specific to
automated driving.199 First, it enhances the broader dialogue about what governments
are and should be doing. Second, it assists companies that are considering where to
develop or deploy technologies relevant to automated driving—a category that is far
broader than just vehicles. Third, it builds institutional credibility, which will be
particularly important in the event of a crash or other setback. Finally, this
communication helps to appropriately manage public expectations about these
technologies and applications.200
VII.

CONCLUSION

This Article has briefly introduced a number of administrative, legal, and
community strategies for encouraging automated driving. These strategies start from
a careful understanding of emerging technologies and applications, of existing legal
constraints and tools, and of local needs and opportunities. This understanding is

194. See Autonomous Vehicles, NEVADA DMV, http://www.dmvnv.com/autonomous.htm (last visited
Mar. 15, 2016); Autonomous Vehicles in California, supra note 23.
DEP’T
OF
TRANSP.,
195. See
Florida
Automated
Vehicles,
FLORIDA
http://www.automatedfl.com/2016summit/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
196. See Mobility Transformation Center, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, http://www.mtc.umich.edu/
(last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
ASS’N
OF
MOTOR
VEHICLES
ADM’RS,
197. Current
Legislation,
AM.
http://capwiz.com/aamva/issues/(last visited Mar. 15, 2016).
198. See supra Administrative strategies (recommending such a person).
199. Government transparency is important generally as well.
200. See Eva Kaplan-Leiserson, Driving the Future, PE MAG. (Jan./Feb. 2016),
http://www.nspe.org/resources/pe-magazine/january-2016/driving-the-future (National Society of
Professional Engineers).
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necessary to optimize the physical, digital, legal, and social infrastructures on which
automated driving will depend.
An important perspective on safety should guide the implementation of
these strategies: Governments should appreciate the risks of both automated and
conventional motor vehicle travel. Contrary to some assertions, automated vehicles
are not yet demonstrably better than human drivers across a full range of driving
conditions.201 Suggesting (without demonstrating) otherwise risks raising public
expectations unrealistically high. At the same time, the considerable dangers of
conventional driving202 are not sufficiently appreciated by the public or addressed by
policymakers. In short, the public should be concerned about automated driving but
terrified about human driving.
For this reason, governments should expect more from all motor vehicles
and their drivers rather than uniquely burdening automated systems. Policymakers
concerned about the potential malfunction of automated vehicles should expend at
least as much energy on the actual misbehavior of conventional drivers. And
policymakers eager to promote automated driving should address subtle subsidies
for the ownership and operation of conventional vehicles that could disadvantage
new products and services. In other words, governments should encourage
automated driving by raising the bar for all forms of driving.

201. See Myra Blanco et al., Automated Vehicle Crash Rate Comparison Using Naturalistic Data
Final
Report
at
iii-iv,
VA.
TECH.
TRANSP.
INST.
(Jan.
2016),
http://www.vtti.vt.edu/PDFs/Automated%20Vehicle%20Crash%20Rate%20Comparison%20Using%20
Naturalistic%20Data_Final%20Report_20160107.pdf (comparing automated driving with safety drivers
to conventional driving); Bryant Walker Smith, Driving at Perfection, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Mar.
11, 2012, 3:20 pm), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/03/driving-perfection; See generally
CALIFORNIA
DMV,
AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLE
DISENGAGEMENT
REPORTS(2011),
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/detail/vr/autonomous/disengagement_report (link to list of separate
reports describing incidents)
202. See, e.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, 10
LEADING
CAUSES
OF
DEATH
BY
AGE
GROUP,
UNITED
STATES—2013,
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-charts/leading_causes_of_death_by_age_group_2013-a.gif
(last
visited Mar. 15, 2016); CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL,
10 LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH BY AGE GROUP HIGHLIGHTING UNINTENTIONAL INJURY DEATHS,
UNITED
STATES—2013,
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-charts/leading
_causes_of_injury_deaths_highlighting_unintentional_injury_2013-a.gif (last visited Mar. 15, 2016);
Bryant Walker Smith, Human Error as a Cause of Vehicle Crashes, CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Dec.
18, 2013, 3:15 pm), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2013/12/human-error-cause-vehicle-crashes.
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VIII.

STRATEGY CHECKLIST

Administrative strategies
Prepare government
Identify a point person
Understand automated driving
Cultivate broader expertise
Review planning processes
Develop break-the-glass plans
Provide resources
Prepare infrastructure
Maintain roadways
Review design policies
Implement design policies
Train roadway personnel
Standardize data
Update registration databases
Cooperate on DSRC
Improve wireless networks
Manage congestion
Calm neighborhood traffic
Plan infrastructure
Leverage procurement
Advocate for AEIS mandates
Legal strategies
Analyze existing law
Conduct a legal audit
Consider all relevant law
Consider existing legal tools
Review enforcement discretion
Calibrate existing law
Collaborate with private actors
Facilitate uniformity
Reference levels of automation
Extend regulatory reciprocity
Codify interpretive conventions
Distinguish passengers from drivers
Permit the use of electronic devices
Enforce safety requirements
Enforce speed laws
Enforce distracted driving laws
Enforce intoxicated driving laws
Enforce (and update) seatbelt laws
Enforce vehicle laws
Internalize the costs of driving
Raise fuel taxes
Reduce parking subsidies
Raise insurance minimums
Rationalize insurance
Embrace flexibility
Tailor legal mechanisms
Clarify enforcement discretion
Formalize exemption authority
Encourage public safety cases
Community strategies
Identify local needs and opportunities
Identify allies and constituencies
Prepare society
Be public
General strategies
Anticipate a surprising future
Appreciate the risks of driving generally
Expect more from all vehicles and drivers
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